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A Report on the California
Appellate Systemt
by
J. CLARK KELSO*
Introduction
Although the right to appeal is not recognized as one of our fun-
damental rights of due process or equal protection, the ability to ap-
peal an adverse decision would nevertheless appear to be one of the
most cherished indicia of civilized government.' We learn at a very
early age that one way to avoid having our toys taken away by an
older sibling or playmate is to protest this unfair treatment to the
nearest authority figure-usually a parent. And if relief is not granted
by one parent, we seek help from the other parent.
The underlying sentiment that there is (or must be) a higher au-
thority which may be consulted to correct injustice has been ingrained
in formal, governmental dispute-resolution systems throughout re-
corded history. The right of appeal has been a component of govern-
f The first draft of this Article was sent out to more than 125 reviewers, including all
appellate judges in California. The penultimate draft was sent to all members of the
Commission on the Future of the Courts. The author acknowledges the helpful responses
received from all reviewers. There are too many to thank here. Accordingly, please see
the list in the Appendix following this Article.
* Professor, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. This Article was
prepared for the use of the Appellate Courts Committee, Commission on the Future of the
Courts, State of California. The Committee consists of the Honorable George Nicholson
(Chair) (Third District Court of Appeal), the Honorable Harry Low (Retired), the Honor-
able Vance Raye (Third District Court of Appeal), the Honorable Judith McConnell (Su-
perior Court, County of San Diego), the Honorable Dan Lungren (Attorney General), Ms.
Fern Laethem (State Public Defender), and Mr. Richard Chernick (Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher). The views expressed herein are the views of the author.
1. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1894). The Court's interpretation of
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses is of course informed by long-standing prac-
tice. In light of the almost universal availability of one appeal as of right, there is an argu-
ment that, notwithstanding the Court's decision in McKane, the Constitution today
requires one appeal as a matter of right. But see Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985)
(holding that if a state has an appellate system, the procedures must comport with due
process and equal protection) (citing McKane).
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mental dispute-resolution systems for at least 6000 years. Ancient
Egypt (circa 4000 B.C.E.) is one of the earliest known societies to in-
corporate some form of appellate process.2
This is not to say, however, that every judicial system has included
a right to appeal. To the contrary, certain well-developed judicial sys-
tems dispensed with appeals altogether, being satisfied with the final
judgment of the initial tribunal. Ancient Greece (circa 450 B.C.E.)
provided one of the earliest and most famous of these systems. There,
the tribunal of first instance-numbering from 200 to several thou-
sand citizens of the city-was also the court of last resort.3 The fact
that there was no appeal from the tribunal's judgment was, no doubt,
due in part to the intensely democratic nature of Greece's city-states.
Simply put, the people were the highest authority. When the jury of
several hundred had rendered its decision, the people had spoken.
In the United States, however, legal systems have almost always
included a right of appeal to a higher judicial authority. As one appel-
late judge noted, "The opportunity to take one's case to 'a higher
court' as a matter of right is one of the foundation stones of both our
state and federal court systems."' 4 There is nothing necessarily better
or more just about the decision of a higher authority; such decisions
are followed not because they are always better, but because they are
decisions from a higher authority. As Justice Jackson noted, "We are
not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because
we are final."5
There are legitimate reasons for maintaining an appellate system
apart from historical practice. Traditional wisdom involves the follow-
ing core reasons for permitting appeals in our common-law system:
(1) to correct errors committed by the tribunal from which the appeal
is taken;6 (2) to have a consistent, uniform declaration of what the law
is, not only in the case on appeal, but also as it will be applied to
2. 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS 11-
13, 28-34 (1928).
3. Id. at 289-93.
4. FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE 16 (1980).
5. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). Accordingly,
the mere fact that an appellate court may reverse the decision of the lower court does not
necessarily mean that the appellate court's decision is right and the lower court's decision
is wrong. Thus, in analyzing the work of appellate courts, one must exercise caution in
interpreting rates of reversal or affirmance. Affirmance and reversal statistics, standing
alone, may be poor indicators of how well the appellate system is working.
6. See infra Part III.B. As will be seen below, the error correction goal should be
broadened to include the idea of error reduction. That is, appellate courts should be doing
more than merely correcting an error in a completed trial; appellate courts should be ac-
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similar cases in the future; and (3) to satisfy the public's demand for
justice, which includes a demand that important grievances be heard
and resolved by the highest possible governmental authority.7
In addition to these core goals, an appellate system, being only
one part of a much larger justice system, must strive to meet the
broader goals of the entire judicial system. Indeed, the California
Courts of Appeal and Supreme Court, by virtue of their status as
courts of last resort,8 should set a model of leadership for the adminis-
tration of justice. These broader goals include at least the following:9
1. Analyze and plan for the future of the California court system.
2. Implement an improved system for predicting the need for judi-
cial resources.
3. Improve mechanisms to provide adequate funding for the judi-
cial system.
4. Identify and utilize technology that can assist in improving ac-
cess to the courts.
5. Develop statewide records-management policies.
6. Adopt statewide facility standards and determine statewide fa-
cility needs.
7. Improve and expand bench officer training and access thereto.
8. Improve efficiency in the judicial system through staff and man-
agement development programs.
9. Improve fairness in the courts.
10. Promote public understanding of the judicial system.
11. Improve access to justice by increasing judicial resources, pro-
viding alternatives to litigation, and reducing the cost and com-
plexity of court proceedings.
12. Reduce unnecessary delay in trial courts.
13. Reduce unnecessary delay in appellate courts.
14. Improve the function of juvenile law, family law, and other pro-
ceedings involving children and families.
15. Encourage reduction in unnecessary disparity between local
court rules.
16. Improve the administration of the traffic adjudication system in
the courts.
17. Recognize and honor contributions to the administration of
justice.
tively seeking ways to reduce error in future proceedings and, equally important, to reduce
the need for future trials at all.
7. See, e.g., STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS 4 (1977) [hereinafter
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS]; PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE
ON APPEAL 2-3 (1976); COFFIN, supra note 4, at 16; RoscoE POUND, APPELLATE PROCE-
DURE IN CIVIL CASES 1-3 (1941); Philip B. Kurland, Jurisdiction of the United States
Supreme Court: Time for a Change?, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 616, 618 (1974).
8. See infra Part I.A.
9. These goals have been reordered from the priorities established by the Judicial
Council of California. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT
xxvii-xxviii (1993) [hereinafter 1992 ANNUAL REPORT].
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The future of the appellate system in California must be assessed
against the core goals of appellate review and the broader goals of our
judicial system. Such an assessment may be conveniently divided into
three parts: (1) access to appellate review; (2) the appellate process;
and (3) the public output of the appellate courts.
Our system of appeals involves more than just process. Appellate
courts have complex relationships with other components of the judi-
cial branch, 10 with other branches and levels of government, and with
various public constituencies.11 This Article reviews both the appel-
late process and the relationships between the appellate courts and
other groups.
10. See infra Figure 1.
11. This set of relationships may be conceptualized as a "justice network" that con-
sists, in part, of:
* State Judicial Branch-Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, Judicial Council,
Administrative Office of the Courts, and the Commission on Judicial
Performance.
* State Executive Branch-Attorney General, Public Defender, Youth and
Adult Corrections Agency, Department of Motor Vehicles, and the California
Highway Patrol.
* State Legislative Branch.
* Counties-Superior Courts, Municipal Courts, Probation Departments,
Law Libraries, County Counsels, District Attorneys, Public Defenders, and
Sheriffs.
* Cities-City Attorneys, Police Departments.
George Nicholson, 2020 Justice-Technology and the Future of Justice in California, GOV'T
TECH., June 1993, at 5 (special section on "Judicial Automation").
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The California Judiciary
There are three independent branches of government, the executive, the legislative, and the judi-
cial. Together, appellate and trial courts comprise the judicial branch. Although appellate and
trial courts have their own staffs, the State Judicial Council and the State Administrative Office
of the Courts provide oversight and guidance for the entire judicial branch. Appellate courts are
state funded. Until recently, trial courts were locally funded. Court budgets comprise very small
portions of either state or local governmental budgets. The appellate courts' total operational
budget is a mere 0.2 percent of all state expenditures. The trial courts (superior, municipal, and
justice) are in transition from local funding to state funding and into one, merged, trial court.
Probation services and alternative sentencing program audit. and oversight mechanisms are
essential components of judicial operations They, too, may soon be state funded and regional-
ized. The State Supreme Court consists of seven justices and is based in San Francisco. The
court has discretionary review except for appeals involving capital punishment or the Public
REME COURT
7ju es; based in San Francisco.
COURT OF EAL
88 justices; based in istricts.
SUPERIOR COURTS
789 judges who preside in courts of g ral jurisdiction.
MUNICIPAL AND JUSTICE COURTS
670 judges (623 municipal, 47 justice) who preside in co of limited jurisdiction.
ATTORN'EYS
138,000) members of the California State Bar.
POPULATION
31,000,000 Californians, all of whom are actual or potential litigants.
The Court of Appeal consists of 88 appellate justices divided into 6 districts located in San
Francisco (First District), Los Angeles (Second District with one Division in Ventura),
Sacramento (Third District), San Diego (Fourth District with Divisions in Santa Ana and San
Bernardino), Fresno (Fifth District), and San Jose (Sixth District). The court has mandatory
appellate review except for discretionary review in original proceedings involving writs. The
trial courts include superior, municipal, and justice courts. Superior courts have general jurisdic-
tion, including appellate review of municipal and justice courts, civil cases (more than $25,000),
family law, juvenile law, probate law, and final felony proceedings. There are 789 judges (along
with 24 referees and 114 commissioners) who perform limited judicial functions. The municipal
and justice courts have limited jurisdiction, including civil cases (less than $25,000), small
claims, residential evictions, all misdemeanor proceedings, and preliminary felony proceedings.
There are 670 judges (623 municipal and 47 justice court judges, along with 7 referees and 155
commissioners) who perform limited judicial functions.
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1L Access to Appellate Review
Although the United States Constitution does not require a state
to provide an appellate system, every state does S0.12 In California,
rights to appeal are created both by the California Constitution and by
statute, and appeals are heard by three different appellate courts: the
appellate department of the superior court, the court of appeal, and
the supreme court.
A. Access to and Workload of the Superior Court and the Appellate
Department of the Superior Court
The superior court and the appellate department of the superior
court, which exercise jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the
municipal and justice courts, process more appeals than the court of
appeal.13 From 1991 until 1992, for example, the superior court and
its appellate department disposed of 23,595 appeals. 14 An extraordi-
narily small percentage of municipal and justice court cases are ap-
pealed: From 1991 to 1992, only 3.25 percent of civil dispositions were
appealed (23,626 cases), and only 0.034 percent of criminal disposi-
tions were appealed (4,435 cases).' 5
The appellate department sits in three-judge panels, with judges
drawn from the superior court. In most counties, judges are assigned
only part-time to the appellate department, and superior court judges
from other counties are assigned in some counties that have fewer
than three superior court judges.16 Because of its workload, the ap-
pellate department in Los Angeles has four full-time judges.' 7
Appellate departments function in much the same way as do
courts of appeal. The record of proceedings in the trial court is pre-
12. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, THE PULSE OF JUSTICE 51 (1993).
13. Municipal and justice courts have jurisdiction in criminal misdemeanor and infrac-
tion cases, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1462 (Deering Supp. 1993), in civil cases of $25,000 or less,
and in small claims cases not exceeding $5,000, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 86, 86.1, 116.210-
.220, 904.2 (Deering Supp. 1993). A litigant dissatisfied with a judgment in a small claims
matter may request trial de novo in the superior court. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§§ 116.710(b), 116.770(a) (Deering Supp. 1993). Criminal misdemeanor and infraction
cases, and civil cases with a value of $25,000 or less, are appealed to the appellate depart-
ment. See generally 2 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 34
(1994) [hereinafter 1993 ANNUAL REPORT].
14. 1 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 56 (including civil and criminal appeals
from lower courts).
15. Id. at 59, 86.
16. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 77(a) (Deering Supp. 1993).
17. Id.
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pared for review, briefs are filed, oral argument is held,'8 and at least
in Los Angeles, each case is disposed of by written opinion. 19
Although appellate department opinions may be published in accord-
ance with California Rules of Court,20 the overwhelming majority of
appellate department decisions result in unpublished opinions.
Decisions by the appellate department are not appealable to the
court of appeal. Appellate department cases only reach the court of
appeal upon department certification to the court of appeal or upon a
court of appeal's order to transfer a case from the appellate depart-
ment.21 Thus, except in the unlikely event the supreme court grants a
petition for a writ of certiorari, the decision by the appellate depart-
ment is the final decision.
Because of the number of cases processed by the superior court
and its appellate department and the lack of further review by the
court of appeal, it is fair to describe California's appellate system as
including two intermediate appellate courts that share the intermedi-
ate appellate workload. When California's trial-level courts are uni-
fied into one trial court-a process that will surely be completed long
before 2020-the importance and independence of the appellate de-
partment will become clearer.
B. Access to and Workload of the Court of Appeal
The court of appeal has appellate jurisdiction in all cases over
which the superior courts have original jurisdiction, and in certain
other cases as provided by statute.22 The court of appeal has original
jurisdiction in habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition
proceedings.23
Only a very small percentage of decisions by the court of appeal
are reviewed by the supreme court,24 and as a practical matter, the
court of appeal ends up being the court of last resort in the over-
18. See CAL. CT. R. 121-44.
19. There is no requirement that appellate department decisions be supported by a
written opinion, however. CAL. CT. R. 106.
20. CAL- CT. R. 976.
21. CAL. CT. R. 62, 63; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 911 (Deering Supp. 1993).
22. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 11.
23. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10.
24. In 1991-92, for example, there were 22,415 total dispositions by the court of ap-
peal. 2 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 27. In the same year, the California
Supreme Court disposed of only 5,466 matters, and not all of those involved review of
court of appeal decisions. Id. at 7. Moreover, the supreme court decided only 89 matters
by written opinion, less than one-half of 1% of the court of appeal's dispositions, and 26 of
those opinions involved death penalty appeals directly from the superior court. Id. at 7,13.
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whelming majority of cases. Despite this fact, the literature on the
appellate process traditionally asserts that the primary function of an
intermediate appellate court is to correct errors, and that its secondary
function is to guide the development of the law.25 Although histori-
cally this hierarchy of functions may have been appropriate, the ex-
ploding appellate caseload and the supreme court's limited capacity to
review significant numbers of intermediate appellate decisions
strongly suggests that today and in the future the court of appeal must
view itself as having an equal responsibility not only to review for cor-
rectness, but also to harmonize and guide the development of the law.
The court of appeal has little direct control over litigants' access.
Although the court of appeal has discretion to consider certain types
of extraordinary writs, most of the work brought to the court of ap-
peal involves appeals of right. In 1991 to 1992, the eighty-eight jus-
tices of the court of appeal were faced with 21,628 new appellate
records filed in contested matters (246 per justice), which represents a
thirty-seven percent increase over the number of appellate records
filed within the last decade.26 During that same decade, there was a
thirty-nine percent increase in the number of superior court filings
and a fifty-one percent increase in the number of superior court dispo-
sitions; this represents a significant improvement in superior court
efficiency. 27
Common sense suggests an important factor in the number of ap-
pellate filings is the number of cases filed in and disposed of by the
superior courts. Assuming the rough equivalence between superior
court filings and appeals is maintained in the future, we can anticipate
appellate filings will be approximately 22,675 in 1995 (thirteen percent
over 1990 figures), 23,183 in 2000 (sixteen percent more than in 1990),
and 23,622 in 2005 (eighteen percent over 1990 filings).28
25. See, e.g., STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS, supra note 7, at 4; CAR-
RINGTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 2-3.
26. 1 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 25.
27. Id. at 44.
28. These appellate filing figures, assuming there actually is a rough equivalence be-
tween superior and appellate court filings, are based on one researcher's projected filings
in the superior courts. SAMUEL KRISLOV, 2020 VISION: A FUTURE OF THE CALIFORNIA
CIVIL COURTS tbl. 8, at 88 (1992). Moreover, filings in superior courts are well-correlated
with local population growth, and appellate filings nationwide (as well as in California) are
well-correlated with overall population growth. STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, AND CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRATORS, THE
PULSE OF JUSTICE-THE BUSINESS OF STATE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS 51-52 (1993)
[hereinafter THE PULSE OF JUSTICE].
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California is actually well on its way to exceeding these projec-
tions by wide margins. As noted above, in 1991 to 1992, 21,628 new
appeal records were filed. This represents a 7.88 percent increase
over the figures for 1990 to 1991. The increase was led by an eleven
percent increase in civil appeals, a thirteen percent increase in crimi-
nal appeals, and a twenty-three percent increase in juvenile appeals.29
Including all notices of appeal for 1991 to 1992, the court of appeal
w~s faced with 24,322 new filings and disposed of 22,415 cases during
the same period (11,718 of these dispositions by written opinion).30
It will be increasingly difficult for the court of appeal to process
the growing number of appeals. At present, the court of appeal is
organized into six districts (eighteen divisions) with a complement of
eighty-eight justices.31 Those eighty-eight justices produced 11,718
written opinions in 1991 to 1992, for an average of 127 majority opin-
ions per judge-equivalent. Furthermore, because the court of appeal
sits in panels of three, each justice is involved in over 375 dispositions
per year.32 These numbers already exceed the recommendation of
Professors Carrington, Meador, and Rosenberg, who advise: "In the
absence of special circumstance, no state appellate court operating at
the first level of review should be asked or permitted to make more
than 100 dispositions on the merits per judgeship per year.133 More-
over, the court of appeal's "clearance rate" (the number of disposi-
tions in a given year divided by the number of appeals filed) has been
steadily dropping for the last several years and fell below the break-
even point in 1991.34
In light of the rising caseload, the future for the court of appeal
looks problematic unless changes are made to California's appellate
system. There are two ways to decrease the court of appeal's work-
load per justice without altering the processes it uses to dispose of its
29. 1 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 25.
30. Id. at 25, 27.
31. Id. at 16.
32. Id. at 15.
33. CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 230.
34. THE PuisE OF JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 54-55. A clearance rate of 100 indicates
that the court disposed of the same number of cases as were filed in the same year. A
clearance rate over 100 indicates the court disposed of more cases than were filed, and a
clearance rate of less than 100 indicates the court disposed of fewer cases than were filed.
In 1989, the California court of appeal had a clearance rate for mandatory appeals of 120.3.
The rate fell to 114.8 in 1990, and fell again to 98.9 in 1991. Id. The clearance rate for all
dispositions and filings in 1991 was slightly less than 92%. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFOR-
NIA, ANNUAL DATA REFERENCE: 1991-92 CASELOAD DATA BY INDIVIDUAL COURTS 5
(1993).
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cases: (1) increase the number of appellate justices or staff or both;
and (2) decrease the number of appeals.
(1) Increase the Number of Appellate Justices or Staff or Both
Assuming numbers of both filings and written opinion disposi-
tions continue to increase and no action is taken to decrease the
number of appeals or improve efficiency, by 1995 some 125 justices
(forty-two percent over the current number) will be needed to pro-
duce an expected 13,190 opinions at the rate of 105 opinions per
judge. At the same rate of increase and based on a straight-line pro-
jection, more than 200 new appellate judges (127 percent over current
numbers) will be needed to meet the anticipated caseload in the year
2020. Arguably, such an increase in the size of the court of appeal
could compromise the cohesiveness of the law and further undermine
the supreme court's ability to assure consistent state-wide actions by
the lower courts.35 It also remains doubtful whether California's cur-
rent and continuing budget crisis will permit such an increase in the
number of appellate judges, especially in the near term. Nevertheless,
the California legislature must soon seriously consider adding more
appellate justices.
Fifty years ago, the appellate court staff was relatively small, and
an appellate judge-who fully authored her own opinions-may have
relied upon her clerks to perform only truly clerical tasks. Those days
have long since vanished.
The modern appellate court simply could not operate without re-
lying significantly upon a professional and efficient staff.36 At literally
every step in the appellate process, staff help is critical. A judge's
primary function is to make the ultimate decision-to cast one of
three or one of seven votes. Prior to making that decision, someone
must sift painstakingly through the record, perform additional legal
research to confirm the parties have found and cited all of the relevant
authority, draft the skeleton of an opinion (e.g., statement of facts)
35. A similar debate over how large the federal judiciary can become before it begins
to crumble under its own weight is now under way. See, e.g., Jon 0. Newman, Expansion
of the U.S. Judiciary Will Diminish Federal Law, S.F. DAILY J., May 19, 1993, at 4 (arguing
that expanding federal judiciary will damage the system). But see Stephen Reinhardt,
Freezing the U.S. Bench at 1,000 Means 2nd-Class Justice for Most, S.F. DAILY J., May 19,
1993, at 4 (arguing that freezing the number of federal judges will create an elite
institution).
36. See generally BERNARD E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS
§§ 7-15 (1977) (describing the duties and functions of law clerks in the appellate courts)
[hereinafter WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS].
[Vol. 45
March 1994] REPORT ON THE CALIFORNIA APPELLATE SYSTEM 443
upon which every decision can be built, and devote time and energy to
other decision-making tasks. These are tasks a modem appellate
judge often delegates to staff attorneys, who are either short-term
clerks or career attorneys.
There is reason to believe additional staff attorneys at the court
of appeal would significantly improve that court's efficiency at a much
lower cost and with more resultant efficiency than the appointment of
new appellate judges. At present, each court of appeal justice is allo-
cated only two research attorneys.37 By contrast, each California
Supreme Court justice has five clerks. Many court of appeal judges
believe they could easily supervise additional clerks, including up to
five clerks as used effectively by the supreme court. The addition of
one to three clerks per appellate justice would have a marked impact
upon the efficiency of case processing. The Judicial Council, the pol-
icy-making body for California's courts, should study this proposal.
(2) Decrease the Number of Appeals
Another way to address rising appellate caseloads is to decrease
the number of appeals taken to the court of appeal. Four strategies
for reducing the number of appeals stand out for consideration: (a)
imposing economic deterrents to appeal; (b) making more appeals dis-
cretionary; (c) reassigning appeals in some categories of cases to the
appellate department of the superior court; and (d) reducing the need
for appeals by reducing the likelihood of trial court error.
a. Providing Economic Deterrents to Appeal
Economic factors already deter civil litigants from filing appeals.
Besides additional attorneys fees, civil litigants bear the expense of
having the trial court record prepared for appeal. There is also a cost
associated with the delay of an appeal, which can prolong litigation for
one, two, or more years.38 These cost-related deterrents are virtually
nonexistent in criminal appeals because the appellant is often indigent
and thus the state has a constitutional responsibility to provide ade-
37. The effective number of clerks per judge may be larger since some judges use
judicial externs, law students who earn credit while performing certain research tasks, usu-
ally supervised by a staff attorney. Id. § 15.
38. Of course, to the extent that the rate of postjudgment interest is less than the
market rate of interest, an appellant may have an economic advantage in delaying enforce-
ment of the judgment for as long as possible in order to exploit the spread between the two
interest rates. At present, postjudgment interest is set at 10%, CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 685.010(a) (Deering 1987), which should deter appellants from filing an appeal solely for
purposes of delay.
quate defense resources. As a result, the costs of a criminal appeal are
often borne by the state, free of charge to the appellant. 39
A substantial additional economic deterrent to filing meritless
civil appeals could be achieved by imposing upon losing parties the
state's actual costs. The amount of such costs is unknown at present,
and estimates vary widely. Actual costs to the state for criminal ap-
peals might indicate similar costs for civil actions. For example, ac-
cording to one estimate, an ordinary criminal appeal may cost
taxpayers an average of $50,000.40 A court put the figure at only
$6,000 per criminal appeal, however.41
Even if the cost to the state could be reasonably quantified, there
remains the difficult policy question of whether judicial services in
civil cases-an essential governmental function-should be financed
from tax revenues (and other sources of revenue such as court fines)
or from charges imposed on users. On the one hand, there is a certain
fairness in requiring those who use governmental services, including
the courts, to pay for those services. On the other hand, charging a
user fee for filing a good faith civil appeal is somewhat inconsistent
with the traditional view that everyone is entitled to at least one ap-
peal. Moreover, the risk of losing on appeal, and thus having to pay
for an appeal,will undoubtedly deter some meritorious appeals. Thus,
potential user fees undermine at least two of the core goals of the
appellate system: correcting errors (because more trial court errors
will go uncorrected) and satisfying the public's demand for justice (be-
cause economic burdens will make it more difficult to file meritorious
civil appeals).
Criminal appeals present entirely different problems. The Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution require
states in criminal cases to provide indigent defendants with the same
access to appellate courts as wealthy defendants. To that end, states
must provide legal counsel for defendants who are unable to afford
it.42 The absence of any economic deterrents to appeal, combined
39. See, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393-94 (1985) (holding that due process and
equal protection guarantee criminal defendants effective assistance of counsel on their first
appeal as of right); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-56 (1963) (holding that denial
of appointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
40. Stephen Green, Tougher Crime Laws Hit the Pocketbook, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Feb. 5, 1989, at A3.
41. People v. Olson, 264 Cal. Rptr. 817, 819 (Ct. App. 1989). The disparity may be
due in part to consideration of all governmental costs as compared to costs limited exclu-
sively to the appellate court.
42. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 39.
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with the serious consequences of a criminal conviction, results in a
high proportion of appeals in criminal cases notwithstanding a low re-
versal rate.43 Since an economic penalty against either appointed
counsel or indigent appellant for filing and losing an appeal in good
faith is both impractical and probably unconstitutional, some com-
mentators have suggested that indigent appellants could be en-
couraged not to appeal with economic incentives. For example,
indigent criminal appellants could be offered the choice of receiving a
free appeal, which might cost the state tens of thousands of dollars, or
receiving a cash credit, which might, for example, be $5,000 immedi-
ately upon waiving right to appeal or $5,000 upon release. This type
of program would save the state money and reduce the number of
meritless criminal appeals. There remains, however, the serious con-
stitutional question of whether such an incentive program is consistent
with the state's obligation to provide indigent defendants with an
equal opportunity to appeal criminal convictions."
Overall, there is little hope that new economic deterrents to ap-
peal (or incentives not to appeal) will reduce the appellate caseload in
California.
b. Increasing the Number of Discretionary Appeals
Appellate caseloads could be reduced by authorizing the court of
appeal to exercise greater control over its docket through limiting the
categories of cases in which appeals are mandatory. At present, a rel-
atively high rate of appeal (about twenty-three appeals for every 100
contested civil cases and about 152 appeals for every 100 convictions
after contested trials) is linked with extremely low rates of success by
appellants, particularly in criminal appeals (during 1991 and 1992
about six out of 100 criminal appeals and twenty-five out of 100 civil
appeals resulted in reversal).45
43. In 1991-92, there were 152 appeals from every 100 convictions after contested
trials. 1 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 15. A significant number of appeals
follow guilty pleas, which explains how 152 appeals follow 100 convictions after contested
trials. Id. Ninety-four percent of criminal appeals result in affirmances. Id. at 16.
44. First, how could an indigent defendant intelligently determine whether to accept
the offer without having appellate counsel make a determination about the likely success
on appeal? Arguably, the state would have to appoint counsel to help the defendant make
that decision (an appointment that would increase the cost of the program to the state).
Second, even if an indigent defendant received competent advice from counsel, $5,000 may
be so great a sum of money as to cloud the defendant's decision-making ability. There is
certainly an element of over-reaching in a program that offers a substantial sum of money
to a criminal defendant for waiver of a constitutional right.
45. 1 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 15-16.
California could control access to the court of appeal through pe-
titions for review in place of its current practice of allowing every liti-
gant one appeal as a matter of right. Using such a procedure, the
court of appeal might dispose of much of its current workload without
hearing oral arguments or drafting opinions in every case. Instead,
the court of appeal might review each record in light of each petition
for review, and, if it appears no meritorious issues for appeal are
presented, deny such a petition with a one-sentence order.
However, eliminating a litigant's appeal as a matter of right has
extremely troubling implications and consequences. First, even if due
process would permit California to abandon appeals as a matter of
right, the public's perception of the judicial system would surely suf-
fer, given its long-standing tradition that every litigant has a right to
appeal. How would the public react to being told that, notwithstand-
ing trial court errors that may occur in litigation in which they may be
involved, the court of appeal could refuse even to hear the appeal by
denying the petition for review?
Second, full briefing, oral argument, and the requirement of a
written opinion are designed to impress upon the court of appeal its
responsibility to consider carefully and then to explain reasonably its
disposition of a case. A petition for review procedure could result in
the court of appeal shirking its case-by-case responsibility in favor of
judicial economy. There would be the additional risk that whole
classes of cases might be denied review routinely and unceremoni-
ously because particular appellate judges believe such cases are not
worthy of significant court time (e.g., appeals from guilty pleas in
criminal cases).
Third, it is unclear how much time and effort instituting a petition
for review procedure would save. Counsel would still have to present
full briefs setting forth alleged errors in the trial court proceedings.
The court of appeal would still have to evaluate those contentions on
their merits. Thus, the only real savings would include reductions in
time and resources spent on the number of both oral arguments and
written opinions. There are, however, other ways of addressing the
oral argument problem,46 and since unpublished opinions already tend
to be shorter than published opinions, it is unclear how much judicial
energy actually would be saved.
Giving the court of appeal complete control over its docket
through petitions for review would be a poor way of addressing the
46. See infra Part II.D.
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appellate caseload dilemma. Such a procedure would undermine the
public's confidence in the judicial system, and the benefits are specula-
tive and perhaps minimal. That is too high a price to pay for docket
control.47
c. Increasing the Use of the Superior Court Appellate Department
Diverting select court of appeal cases to the superior court appel-
late department stands out as one of the most likely responses to in-
creasing court of appeal caseloads. This option would preserve appeal
as a matter of right, an important part of our appellate tradition, but
would still reduce the court of appeal's caseload.
Simply transferring appeals from the court of appeal to another
tribunal would effect no net savings-and would thus be unjustifi-
able-unless the other tribunal could handle the cases more speedily
or accurately. Arguably, the appellate department of a superior court,
which is staffed by trial judges who might have direct access to the
trial court's file, could handle appeals more speedily and accurately
when the issues are limited to questions of trial procedure under es-
tablished law, repetitive application of certain statutes, or exercise of
trial court discretion. For example, appeals after guilty pleas might be
routed to the appellate department because they often raise issues
pertaining to sentencing errors or trial procedure errors.48 Such a
shift would significantly lighten the court of appeal's docket without
depriving criminal defendants of appeal as a matter of right. These
limited types of appeals would be disposed of more quickly by the
superior court appellate department because of its proximity to the
trial court.
d. Reducing the Need for Appeals
The best way to lighten the appellate caseload is to reduce the
need for and number of trials and diminish errors committed in those
47. Although a general petition for review procedure is inefficient, there may be
greater merit in identifying certain narrow classes of appeals that would be subject to a
petition for review procedure. In Virginia, such a system is in place at the intermediate
appellate level, where certain categories of cases are reviewable only by petition. See Ber-
nard G. Barrow, The Discretionary Appea" A Cost Effective Tool of Appellate Justice, 11
GEO. MASON U. L. Rnv. 31, 31-39 (1988).
48. Appeals in cases in which the offender has been sentenced to less than six months
would also appear to be amenable to appellate department review, although for a slightly
different reason. At present, review by the court of appeal is usually impractical in these
cases because the sentence is served before the appeal can be heard. An expedited appeal
to the appellate department based upon the trial court's file would appear to be a possible
solution to this problem.
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trials. Although these factors may not seem to be within the control
of appellate courts, rules of law and rules of court adopted by appel-
late courts in fact have a direct impact on both how many disputes
result in trials and how well those trials are conducted.
Certain disputes will reach the trial courtrooms no matter which
rules of law are adopted. Indeed, the entire judicial system exists pre-
cisely to resolve disputes justly; efficiency for its own sake is not the
sole or even a primary consideration.
However, appellate courts can formulate rules of law that would
reduce the number of disputes, particularly civil disputes, and would
diminish the number of trial errors. A reasonable litigant will not go
through the expense and trauma of a trial (or an appeal) unless there
is at least a substantial or reasonable likelihood of success. Since it
takes two to litigate, cases will go to trial only if both parties think
they have a chance of winning, and this is when appellate courts can
exercise some influence. "Lawsuits are fought if both sides think they
have a shot at winning. The more stable and certain the law, the less
the chance that both sides will think they can win."'49
Law is made less certain in many different ways. The size and
structure of the appellate system may itself create uncertainty. The
more opinions there are in a common-law system of precedents, the
more likely there will be inconsistent opinions and uncertainty in the
law. The more judges there are deciding the cases, the more likely
there will be conflicts in the law stemming from inconsistent interpre-
tations of the law and case precedents. This reasoning suggests that
expanding the number of appellate judges in an effort to address ris-
ing caseloads might actually have the effect of increasing the number
of appeals.
Of even greater importance, rejecting narrow rules of law in favor
of general standards to be applied by a fact finder makes every case a
possible winner for both plaintiff and defendant. The result is an in-
centive for both parties to litigate. One of the best examples is Justice
Cardozo's replacement of a "stop, look, and listen" rule in railroad
crossing cases with a general standard of reasonableness. 50 The stop,
look, and listen rule had screened out many cases that, under the gen-
49. Paul M. Bator, What Is Wrong with the Supreme Court?, 51 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673,
690 (1990) (emphasis added); see also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1185 (1989) (arguing that the establishment of broadly applicable
general principles is an essential component of the judicial process).
50. Compare Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 105 (1934) (Cardozo, J.) (advis-
ing the "need for caution in framing standards of behavior that amount to rules of law")
with Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 69-70 (1927) (Holmes, J.)
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eral standard of reasonableness, suddenly became open to litigation.
In California, the clear rule forbidding emotional distress recoveries in
negligence cases (except when the emotional distress was an aggrava-
tion of a personal injury or property damage) 51 was replaced by a rule
permitting recovery in certain cases depending upon a balancing of
factors.52 The change has resulted in confusion in the law, not only in
the trial courts, but among the California Supreme Court's own
precedents.5 3
Similar ambiguities in other areas of the law have also en-
couraged litigants to bring lawsuits. For example, the abandonment of
contributory negligence in favor of comparative fault has encouraged
plaintiffs, who otherwise may have been reluctant, to throw the litiga-
tion dice.5 4 The long and confusing history of products liability in Cal-
ifornia has kept thousands of lawyers employed for more than thirty
years trying to decipher the law.:5 Most recently, the California
Supreme Court decided a pair of implied assumption of risk cases that
has left everyone guessing.5 6
("[W]hen the standard [of conduct] is clear it should be laid down once and for all by the
courts.").
51. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 44-45 (Ct. App. 1963).
52. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920-21 (Cal. 1968).
53. Burgess v. Superior Ct., 831 P.2d 1197,1199-1203 (Cal. 1992) (holding that mother
who observes injury to child during delivery results in "direct victim" rather than "by-
stander" cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Christensen v. Supe-
rior Ct., 820 P.2d 181, 188-92 (Cal. 1991) (permitting recovery to close family members for
negligent infliction of emotional distress due to mishandling of corpses); Thing v. La
Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989) (allowing recovery for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress when plaintiff is closely related to victim, present at scene of injury, and
suffers serious emotional distress); Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 583-87 (Cal. 1988)
(holding no cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress when death of
unmarried cohabitant witnessed); Ochoa v. Superior Ct., 703 P.2d 1, 6-8 (Cal. 1985) (hold-
ing negligent infliction of emotional distress exists when parent observes defendant's negli-
gent conduct toward child); Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 814-23 (Cal.
1980) (allowing recovery by direct victim for negligent infliction of emotional distress when
only mental injury suffered).
54. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1230-32 (Cal. 1975) (replacing "all or noth-
ing" contributory negligence theory with comparative negligence system).
55. J. Clark Kelso, One Lesson from the Six Monsanto Lectures on Tort Law Reform
and Jurisprudence: Recognizing the Limits of Judicial Competence, 26 VAL. U. L. Rnv. 765,
786-92 (1992).
56. Ford v. Gouin, 834 P.2d 734, 740 (Cal. 1992) (holding that the duty of co-partici-
pants in a cooperative activity is to avoid intentional injuries or reckless conduct outside
the range of the activity); Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 707 (Cal. 1992) (holding that
when risks are inherent in an activity, participants may only be held liable for intentional
injuries). The fallout and confusion engendered by these decisions have been quick in
coming. See, e.g., Handelman v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126, 138
(holding that skier did not assume risk of injury while skiing) (Raye, J., dissenting), depub-
Admittedly, there are times when a general standard is appropri-
ate. But by the same token, general standards should not be pursued
for their own sake. For example, new jury questions should not be
created when a rule of law would do the job just as well. The appel-
late courts have an obligation to guide the development of the law in a
way that gives the public some sense of certainty and predictability.
Indeed, that is one of the core functions of an appellate court.57 De-
veloping stable, certain, and predictable rules of law may be the most
important thing appellate courts can do to reduce not only their own
caseloads, but also the burden placed upon trial courts.
C. Access to and Workload of the California Supreme Court
As the highest court in the state, the California Supreme Court,
consisting of a Chief Justice and six associate justices, is primarily re-
sponsible for deciding cases that raise important issues of public con-
cern and maintaining uniformity in state law.5 8 Because the supreme
court's primary function is to guide and harmonize the development
of state law, it is important that the court be given as much control as
possible over its own docket. In fact, access to the supreme court is
quite limited, unlike access to the court of appeal. The court has origi-
nal, but purely discretionary, jurisdiction in cases seeking extraordi-
nary relief in the nature of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and
habeas corpus.59 Moreover, the court's general appellate jurisdiction
over other civil and criminal appeals is by a petition for review.6 0 For
the most part, the supreme court has been given significant, almost
absolute, control over its docket.
California's supreme court experienced the same sort of work-
load increase felt by the court of appeal during the past decade. The
supreme court faced 5,403 filings in the 1991-92 term (772 per justice),
up thirty-six percent from the 3,969 filings in 1982-83.61 Much of the
lished and review denied, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 4168 (Ct. App. 1993); Milwaukee Elec. Tool
Corp. v. Superior Ct., 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24, 34 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the primary
assumption of risk doctrine is inapplicable to strict products liability causes of action).
57. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
58. In exercising its discretion to review the decision of a court of appeal, the supreme
court looks for the following types of errors: "(1) where it appears necessary to secure
uniformity of decision or the settlement of important questions of law; (2) where the Court
of Appeal was without jurisdiction of the cause; or (3) where, because of disqualification or
other reason, the decision of the Court of Appeal lacks the concurrence of the required
majority of qualified judges." CAL. CT. R. 29(a).
59. CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 10.
60. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 12; CAL. CT. R. 28.
61. 1 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 7.
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increase is attributable to increasing review of attorney disciplinary
proceedings, 62 and a 116 percent increase in original proceedings (vir-
tually all of which was attributable to an increase in habeas filings). 63
Although the supreme court processes many more filings per jus-
tice per year than does the court of appeal (772 per supreme court
justice compared to 246 per court of appeal judge),64 this discrepancy
is not indicative of the relative burdens borne by each court. The
supreme court controls its docket by refusing to grant review in most
cases. 65 In 1991 to 1992, the supreme court granted review in only five
percent of the filed petitions for review, and 44.7 percent of that five
percent were either grant and holds or grant and transfers; neither
dispositions require as much court time as full review.66 When denial
of review and holds or transfers are removed from the statistics, the
number of filings processed per justice is reduced to 265. The
supreme court also rations its resources by resolving a large number of
original proceedings without written opinion (1,204 in 1991 to 1992).67
It takes less time per case for the supreme court to determine which
petitions are worthy of review and to dispose of many original pro-
ceedings without opinion than it does for the court of appeal to give
each appeal plenary consideration followed by a written opinion.
Because the supreme court's primary function is to guide and
harmonize the development of the law (rather than to decide individ-
ual cases), the court must have as much control as possible over its
own docket. Until recently a significant portion of the court's docket
concerned automatic review of certain attorney discipline matters.
Fortunately, that extravagant use of the court's limited resources was
ameliorated in 1991 by converting to discretionary review all State
62. There were 113 filings in 1982-83, as compared to 269 filings in 1991-92. 1 1993
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 7.
63. There was a 16% increase in petitions for review from 1982-83 to 1991-92 (3,205
to 3,724). Original civil filings rose from 206 in 1982-83 to 297 in 1991-92, and original
criminal filings grew by 151.6%-from 411 in 1982-83, when all filings were non-habeas
corpus, to 1,034 in 1991-92, when 970 of the 1,034 filings were habeas. Id. at 8.
64. These figures are somewhat misleading, of course, since all seven justices on the
supreme court act upon nearly all cases. Similarly, the figure given for the court of appeal
is also understated because this court sits in panels of three.
65. As noted above, the level of staff support is also an important factor in an appel-
late court's efficiency. Supreme court justices have significantly more staff support than
court of appeal justices.
66. In 1991-92, the court granted review in 99 cases, granted and held in 56 cases, and
granted and transferred in 24 cases. It denied review in 3,467 cases. 1 1993 ANNUAL RE-
PORT, supra note 13, at 13.
67. Id. at 13.
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Bar Court decisions. 68 The court's mandatory jurisdiction now is lim-
ited (1) to death penalty appeals69 and (2) to appeals from decisions of
the Public Utilities Commission (PUC). 7 0
(1) Review of Death Penalty Appeals
Capital cases remain a significant portion of the California
Supreme Court's workload.7 1 Although the total number of capital
appeals is small compared with all appeals filed in California's appel-
late system (there were only 36 automatic appeals from 1991 to 1992
compared with the 21,628 appeals filed in the court of appeal),72 the
fact that those appeals are concentrated in the supreme court magni-
fies the burden on the appellate system. The supreme court issued
eighty-nine written opinions from 1991 to 1992 (thirteen majority
opinions per justice), but twenty-six of those opinions (twenty percent
of the total and almost four per justice) were in capital cases.73
These percentages do not completely portray the supreme court's
capital case burden, however. Because capital cases are appealed di-
rectly to the supreme court, that court has the responsibility of review-
ing each case fully to correct prejudicial errors, discharged in virtually
all other cases by the court of appeal. Moreover, capital cases tend to
be lengthier and more complex than most other criminal cases, which
again increases the burden on the court's resources. It may take a
court staff attorney as long as six to nine months working full-time to
prepare a capital case for consideration by the justices. As Chief Jus-
tice Lucas noted, one recent capital case involved review of 80,000
68. Prior to the 1991 rule change, the court automatically reviewed interim suspen-
sions upon conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude and recommendations of sus-
pension or disbarment. As a result of the rule change, the court will review interim
suspensions only when:
(1) necessary to settle important questions of law; (2) the State Bar Court has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction; (3) petitioner did not receive a fair
hearing; (4) the decision is not supported by the weight of the evidence; or (5) the
recommended discipline is not appropriate in light of the record as a whole.
CAL. CT. R. 954(a).
69. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 11; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239(b) (Deering 1982).
70. CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 5; CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 1756, 1759 (West 1975 &
Supp. 1993).
71. But see Justice Marcus M. Kaufman, California's Overloaded Supreme Court, L.A.
LAW., Aug.-Sept. 1990, at 30, 59 ("[R]eview of death penalty cases, though a part of the
overall problem, is not nearly so burdensome as some have suggested .....
72. 1 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 7, 25.
73. Id. at 7.
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pages of material.74 Another measure of the burden is found in the
total number of pages devoted to capital cases in the official reports.
During 1991, for example, opinions in twenty-six capital cases filled
1,656 pages out of a total of 3,454 pages for all opinions during the
year.75 Thus, a remarkable forty-eight percent of the text of the court's
opinions were devoted to death penalty review.
In addition to workload burden, concentrating capital cases in the
supreme court may create unusual Iressures on the development of
the law. When such a significant portion of the court's criminal
docket involves one type of case, there is a risk the court will develop
a skewed perspective on criminal law issues.76 There may also be a
psychological toll on the justices when considering capital cases.
Other commentators have noted possible changes in application of the
"harmless error" rule in capital cases,77 and in consideration of evi-
dentiary questions that may be a result of the court's concentration on
capital cases.78 More generally, political attention on the court in the
mid-1970s focused primarily on its capital docket. 79 Finally, when
such a significant portion of the court's work is devoted to a single
type of case, its general obligation to oversee the development of Cali-
fornia law may suffer. Other commentators have noted, for example,
that the court's increasing reliance on depublication of court of appeal
74. Justices Field Questions at Annual Barristers Luncheon, THm RECORDER, Mar. 9,
1993, at 1 [hereinafter Annual Barristers Luncheon].
75. The opinions for the 1991-92 year begin at People v. Daniels, 802 P.2d 907 (Cal.
1991), and end with People v. Price, 821 P.2d 610 (Cal. 1991), which finishes at page 713.
The shortest capital opinion, People v. Fuentes, 818 P.2d 75 (Cal. 1991), was 15 pages, and
the longest, People v. Price, 821 P.2d 610 (Cal. 1991), was 170 pages. The average length of
a capital opinion is 64 pages.
76. Karl Llewellyn observed that litigated cases (especially appeals) bear the same
relation to reality "as does homicidal mania or sleeping sickness, to our normal life."
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THm BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 58 (2d ed.
1951). On the non-representativeness of litigated cases and their influence upon the deci-
sion-making process, see Kelso, supra note 55, at 777, 785; George L. Priest, Reexamining
the Selection Hypothesis: Learning from Whittman's Mistakes, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 215
(1985); Donald Whittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased?, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
185 (1985).
77. C. Elliot Kessler, Death and Harmlessness: Application of the Harmless Error
Rule by the Bird and Lucas Courts in Death Penalty Cases-A Comparison & Critique, 26
U.S.F. L. REv. 41, 84-90 (1991).
78. Scott G. Parker & David P. Hubbard, Comment, The Evidence for Death, 78 CAL.
L. Rv. 973, 1006-26 (1990).
79. See, e.g., J. Clark Kelso & Brigitte A. Bass, The Victims' Bill of Rights: Where Did
It Come From and How Much Did It Do?, 23 PAC. LJ. 843, 859-60 (1992) (discussing the
struggles from 1972 and 1982 to enact the death penalty between California voters and
legislators and the California Supreme Court, which struck the laws down as
unconstitutional).
decisions may in part be a result of the supreme court's inability to
take such cases for full review.80
There are several suggestions for reducing the court's capital case
burden: (1) repeal the death penalty; (2) create a special court to han-
dle death penalty appeals; and (3) give initial appeal to the court of
appeal in capital cases and make supreme court review discretionary.
Each suggestion has advantages and disadvantages.
a. Repealing the Death Penalty
Repealing the death penalty would have the most dramatic effect
upon the supreme court's docket. Given the widespread public sup-
port for the death penalty, however, it seems unlikely it will be re-
pealed in California anytime soon. Moreover, relieving the appellate
system of the burden of considering death penalty appeals is not a
particularly strong reason-and certainly not a decisive reason-for
repealing the death penalty. Instead, the death penalty should be
evaluated upon its own merits as a means of deterring criminal con-
duct, expressing society's outrage at particularly heinous crimes, and
fulfilling society's demand for retribution. Once the legislature or the
people determines that the death penalty is an appropriate form of
punishment in certain cases, it then becomes the judiciary's obligation
to implement that policy decision in a reasonable manner.
b. Creation of a Special Court for Death Penalty Appeals
Some suggest the creation of a special court for death penalty
appeals. There are several problems with this suggestion. First, the
justices on such a special court would receive an unhealthy judicial
diet of nothing but death penalty cases. Second, concentrating all
death penalty appeals in one court would make that court an easy
target for public criticism and political maneuvering. Third, there is
no reason to believe a special "death court" would do a better job of
handling appeals than either the supreme court or the court of appeal.
In any event, its decisions would undoubtedly be reviewable by the
supreme court. Thus, creating a special court of appeal for capital
cases is an unattractive proposal.
80. See, e.g., Stephen R. Barnett, Making Decisions Disappear: Depublication and
Stipulated Reversal in the California Supreme Court, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1033, 1036-37
(1993).
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c. Discretionary Supreme Court Review in Capital Cases
Others suggest the mandatory appeal to the supreme court of
capital cases should be repealed. This change would allow capital ap-
peals to be handled just like any other criminal appeal. Thus, appeals
would be of right to the court of appeal and supreme court review
would be only by petition. If implemented, the supreme court may be
relieved of some of its capital case burden both in the number of capi-
tal cases on the court's docket and in the type of review afforded these
cases.81 On the other hand, introducing an additional level of appel-
late review might actually slow down the processing of capital cases
and increase their expense, thereby contributing to the public's per-
ception that the judicial system does not competently handle capital
cases.
82
A variation on this proposal could relieve the supreme court of its
duty to consider guilt-phase issues on appeal by granting the court of
appeal review of those issues. The supreme court's mandatory juris-
diction in capital cases would be limited to a review of penalty-phase
issues only. This method would insure some consistency and propor-
tionality for capital cases-although the United States Supreme Court
has not required such proportionality as a matter of its Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence 83-yet would have the benefit of relieving
the supreme court of at least some of the burden associated with capi-
tal appeals.
Although there is no consensus, something must be done to alle-
viate the backlog. There are some 381 prisoners sitting on death
row.84 At the court's present rate of deciding appeals in these cases, it
would take ten years just to process the existing capital cases, and, as
Chief Justice Lucas noted, juries are imposing the death penalty at a
81. The additional burden on the court of appeal would have staffing implications, of
course.
82. At present, the bottleneck in processing capital cases appears to be due to a lack
of appellate counsel. As noted in the 1992 Annual Report, "In death penalty cases, the
court was nearly up to date in calendaring fully briefed cases during 1991. The backlog was
worsened by lack of counsel for more than 60 inmates on death row." 1992 ANNUAL RE-
PORT, supra note 9, at 4. Of course, one wonders what the Supreme Court would do if
suddenly faced with 60 additional death penalty cases in any one year. Moreover, as Chief
Justice Lucas recently noted, the death penalty is being imposed at the rate of about four
per month. See Annual Barristers Luncheon, supra note 74, at 1. Is the supreme court
prepared to both reduce its existing backlog of death penalty cases and handle 48 or more
new death penalty appeals every year?
83. Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1051 (1990).
84. Telephone Interview with Christine May, Public Information Officer, California
Department of Corrections (Jan. 27, 1994). This figure is correct as of January 1, 1994.
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rate of about forty-eight per year.85 The supreme court simply does
not have the capacity to process these appeals without substantially
interfering with its other important obligations to guide California
law.
(2) Review of Public Utilities Commission Decisions
The California Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to re-
view decisions of the Public Utilities Commission by a writ of certio-
rari procedure.8 6 Although there are relatively few such decisions for
review per year,8 7 PUC cases tend to involve complex factual records
and difficult policy questions that consume the court's limited re-
sources. The California Select Committee on Internal Procedures of
the Supreme Court recommended in 1988 that initial review of PUC
decisions should be transferred to the court of appeal.88 The PUC
opposed this proposal, arguing there are few such appeals in any
event, and the cases involve substantial amounts of money and have
statewide impact requiring prompt review.8 9 These arguments are un-
persuasive, since the court of appeal and superior court routinely han-
dle many administrative decisions involving huge amounts of money
and having a statewide impact. Moreover, if there is a genuine need
for prompt review, procedures exist at both the superior court and
appellate level to secure quick review. There is thus no rational basis
for continuing to treat each PUC decision as though it necessarily in-
volves issues so critical to the state that they require immediate
supreme court review. PUC decisions should be routed first to the
court of appeal, with ultimate review retained by the supreme court
pursuant to a petition for review process.90
85. Annual Barristers Luncheon, supra note 74, at 1.
86. CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 5; CAL. PuB. UTIL. CODE §§ 1756, 1759; see also County
of Sonoma v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 708 P.2d 693, 697
(Cal. 1985) (stating that the California Supreme Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction over
PUC matters).
87. There were seven PUC appeals in 1988-89, eleven in 1989-90, eight in 1990-91, and
nine in 1991-92. 1 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 10.
88. SELECT COMMITrEE ON INTERNAL PROCEDURES OF THE SUPREME COURT, RE-
PORT TO HON. MALCOLM M. LUCAS, CHIEF JUSTICE OF CALIFORNIA 24-25 (1988).
89. Id.
90. A compromise position would continue requiring petitions for review to be filed
with the supreme court but authorize the supreme court to transfer cases to the court of
appeal. This procedure would be similar to the review process for Workers' Compensation
Appeal Board decisions. See CAL. LABOR CODE § 5950 (West 1989); see also 2 B.E.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, WORKERS' COMPENSATION § 436 (9th ed. 1987)
("Although [Labor Code Section 5950] provides that the application for writ of review may
be made to 'the Supreme Court or to the court of appeal,' the Supreme Court, by minute
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H. The Appellate Process
The appellate process in America has become somewhat stan-
dardized over the years. Although there are variations in some de-
tails, once a notice of appeal has been filed,91 an appeal typically
involves the following steps: (1) the trial court clerk prepares a record
from the lower court transcript; (2) counsel prepare and file adversary
briefs; (3) in an initial review, the appellate court determines whether
the appeal qualifies for special treatment (e.g., settlement programs,
decision without oral argument, denial of review, or alternative dispo-
sition in discretionary appeals); (4) counsel argue orally before a panel
of three or more judges; (5) the appellate. court reaches a decision
(which includes preargument analysis, a postargument conference,
and collegial drafting of the opinion or opinions); and (6) the appel-
late court publicly releases its opinion.
At each step in this process, there may be room for increased
efficiency, although it should be stressed that the California Supreme
Court and California Courts of Appeal appear to be operating at or
very near their capacity and are, by and large, operating efficiently.
Thus, many of the proposals for change suggested in this paper in-
volve omitting or significantly reducing one or more of the major steps
in the appellate process. However, such proposals come at a high cost
to the appellate system. The wisdom of adopting such proposals de-
pends upon a critical balancing of the risks and benefits of each, and
reasonable minds may differ in striking that balance.
A. Preparing the Record for Appeal
By most accounts, the most significant source of appellate delay
(defined as the time from filing a notice of appeal to final appellate
disposition) is the time it takes to prepare the record for appeal. 92
order, transfers original petitions filed with it."). In exceptionally important cases, the
PUC could argue to the supreme court that it should not transfer the case. The supreme
court would have the opportunity for a quick look at PUC decisions while retaining the
flexibility to offload most cases to the court of appeal.
91. Filing a notice of appeal triggers the beginning of the appellate process in many,
but not all, cases in California. California Penal Code § 1237.5 and California Rule of
Court 31(d) authorize appeals following guilty pleas in criminal matters if the trial court
issues a certificate of probable cause. As much as one-third of the court of appeal's crimi-
nal docket involves appeals after guilty pleas.
92. 1 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 16 ("In both civil and criminal appeals,
studies indicate that most case delay is beyond an appellate court's control. For example,
appellate courts typically must wait a significant amount of time for the trial court record
to be completed. After the record and briefs are filed, most Courts of Appeal decide cases
quite promptly...."). Arguably, the time it takes to prepare an appellate record should
Although rules prescribe a thirty-day period for preparation of the
reporter's transcript and clerk's transcript in civil cases, 93 "the actual
median experience for civil and criminal record filing is four times
greater than that prescribed by the rules: Averages of current statistics
for median record preparation times in all reporting units are 121 days
in civil cases, eighty-four days in criminal, and forty-five days in juve-
nile."94 At present, the record for appeal is usually prepared by the
clerk of the superior court after portions of the record have been des-
ignated by the parties for inclusion in the record on appeal. The re-
porter's transcript is prepared by court reporters. Both the cost of
preparing the record and the delay that process engenders indicate
that the preparation of the record is a significant problem with the
appellate system.
Both the cost and delay associated with preparing the record for
appeal may be reduced. The following short-term proposals should be
considered: (1) require the appellant to prepare the record (in consul-
tation with appellee) rather than the clerk of the superior court, at
least for civil cases in which appellate counsel is very likely to be the
same as trial counsel;95 (2) encourage the appellant to file the record
(in consultation with appellee) in an approved computer form, for ex-
ample, ASCII files or one of the widely used word processing formats;
and (3) give scheduling priority to appeals on less than a full record,
thereby encouraging the filing of such appeals.
In the long-term, technological developments should make delays
associated with preparation of records on appeal disappear entirely.
Nearly all trial court filings will be in an electronic medium, and the
reporter's transcript, which will be created using computer-assisted
technology, will be immediately available. Preparing an appellate rec-
ord in a paperless court will be as simple as transmitting the entire
not be included in an evaluation of court of appeal efficiency because the court of appeal
has little practical ability to control the speed of preparation. In a very real sense, the
clock does not begin running for the court of appeal until the record and all briefs have
been filed. Only then is the case ready for appellate court treatment. Notwithstanding this
argument, virtually all commentators on the appellate process include preparation of the
record as an appellate, and not a trial, concern. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meador, Appellate Case
Management and Decisional Processes, 61 VA. L. RE\,. 255, 257 (1975).
93. CAL. CT. R. 4(d), 5(d).
94. The Honorable Carl West Anderson, Are the American Bar Association's Time
Standards Relevant for California Courts of Appeal?, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 301, 312 (1993)
(emphasis in original). Justice Anderson's article is vital reading for anyone concerned
about appellate delay.
95. At present, the appellant can elect to file an appendix or joint appendix, CAL. CT.
R. 5.1, and the parties can jointly agree to file a superior court file or an agreed statement
in lieu of the clerk's transcript, CAL. CT. R. 5.2, 6.
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case file from the trial court's computer system to the appellate
court's. It is thus very much in the interest of both trial and appellate
courts to experiment with electronic filing and jointly to foster crea-
tion of electronic records. Besides avoiding delays in record prepara-
tion, expedited review of cases in which counsel submit the entire
record and complete briefs on computer disks in a common format,
such as WordPerfect, would create a real incentive to facilitate
achievement of the paperless court.
When this category of delay disappears-as it surely will by
2020-California will undoubtedly discover a bottleneck at some
other point in the process. For instance, if the delay in preparation of
the record, which discourages a certain number of appeals and slows
down many others, were suddenly to disappear, how would the court
of appeal process the flood of cases?
B. Preparing and Filing Adversary Briefs
California follows the long tradition in the United States of re-
quiring an appellant to file a brief setting forth alleged errors commit-
ted by the lower tribunal and providing legal authorities to support
appellant's position. The appellee is then given an opportunity to file
a brief in response. And finally, the appellant is usually given the op-
portunity to file a reply brief.
Appellate judges are well aware, of course, that briefs are usually
anything but brief. Some cases require exhaustive briefing, but it is
questionable whether full briefing was necessary in all of the 11,000-
odd appeals from 1991 to 1992 that resulted in a written opinion. In
England, for example, oral argument is of much greater importance
than the written brief, which apparently lives up to its name in brev-
ity.96 Although no one would seriously suggest entirely dispensing
with written briefs, there have been proposals to reduce the amount of
briefing in certain types of cases through an increased reliance upon
an oral presentation of possible grounds for appeal. Such proposals
are particularly appropriate for certain types of criminal appeals in
which the issues may be relatively simple and few in number.97
Indigent criminal appeals in which appointed counsel has deter-
mined the appeal is meritless comprise one class of cases in California
for which appellate courts receive no briefing. The Sixth Amendment
of the United States Constitution provides that "[iun all criminal pros-
96. CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 27.
97. Id. at 27-29.
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ecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the assistance of
counsel for his defence." 98 In the appellate context, the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantee of assistance of counsel seems to conflict at times
with an appellate attorney's obligation as an officer of the court not to
press frivolous grounds for the appeal.99 That conflict has been re-
solved in favor of the obligation not to make frivolous arguments. As
the United States Supreme Court recently indicated, "An attorney,
whether appointed or paid, is therefore under an ethical obligation to
refuse to prosecute a frivolous appeal."'100
In California, the current practice is controlled by People v.
Wende,10 1 which permits appointed counsel to file a brief that only
"set[s] forth a summary of the proceedings and facts with citations to
the transcript, raise[s] no specific issues, and call[s] upon the court to
make a thorough review of the entire record to determine for itself
whether there were any arguable issues."102 In order to ensure ade-
quate judicial review of criminal convictions, the California Supreme
Court "requires the court to conduct a review of the entire record
whenever appointed counsel submits a brief which raises no specific
issues or describes the appeal as frivolous."10 3
The Wende procedure introduced several anomalies into criminal
appellate practice. First, it permits counsel to file a brief without rais-
ing issues for review, even though counsel has not concluded the ap-
peal is frivolous or requested permission to withdraw. Yet if the
appeal is not frivolous, the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel is hardly protected by a brief that raises
no issues.
Second, as the court recognized in Wende itself, by filing a Wende
brief, "counsel may ultimately be able to secure a more complete re-
view for his client when he cannot find any arguable issues than when
he raises specific issues, for a review of the entire record is not neces-
98. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
99. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 955
(1967) ("[W]hen a lawyer finds that a motion for a new trial or appeal would be wholly
frivolous after a consciencions [sic] examination of the record, he should ... advise the
court .... This is also the position a non-appointed [sic] lawyer should take. He, ethically,
should not clog the courts with frivolous motions or appeals .... "); see also United States
v. Edwards, 777 F.2d 364, 365 (7th Cir. 1985) ("A lawyer, after all, has no duty, indeed no
right, to pester a court with frivolous arguments, which is to say arguments that cannot
conceivably persuade the court .... ).
100. McCoy v. Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 436 (1988).
101. People v. Wende, 600 P.2d 1071 (Cal. 1979).
102. Id. at 1072.
103. Id. at 1074-75.
[Vol. 45
March 1994] REPORT ON THE CALIFORNIA APPELLATE SYSTEM 461
sarily required in the latter situation."'' 1 Although the court in Wende
was "confident... that this state of 'affairs will not cause attorneys to
abandon their professional responsibility to conscientiously review the
record and argue all issues that are arguable,"'105 the Wende procedure
plainly presents appellate counsel with a difficult tactical choice:
whether to sacrifice the full Wende review by the court in order to
present a substantive issue that has only a very small likelihood of
success.
Third, the Wende procedure in effect casts the appellate tribunal
in the uncomfortable role of appellate counsel. When a Wende brief is
received by the court, the case is typically assigned to a staff attorney
who drafts a memorandum reciting the facts and legally analyzing all
possible issues in the case. That staff attorney then makes an oral
presentation to the appellate panel explaining the case and the rea-
sons why the case presents no meritorious issues for review (except, of
course, in the exceedingly rare case when an arguable issue is found).
One or more judges of the panel then read the entire record looking
for any arguable issue that could be raised on behalf of the appellant.
As described, the Wende process duplicates in all relevant aspects the
exact process that appellate counsel must follow in evaluating the
merits of the case.
Fourth, Wende appears to waste state resources. Appointed
counsel are paid to review the record and decide that the appeal lacks
merit, but under Wende, counsel are not required to disclose the rea-
sons for that conclusion and are not required to assist the court in
evaluating the legal merits of the case. As a result, the appellate tribu-
nal must then assign its own staff attorney to duplicate the efforts of
appointed counsel.
The exact burdens created by Wende are difficult to quantify. It is
significant, however, that Wende has been extended in California far
beyond criminal appeals from superior court. It has been extended to
misdemeanor appeals, 10 6 delinquency proceedings under California
Welfare and Institutions Code Section 602,107 termination of parental
rights proceedings under California Civil Code Section 232,108 depen-
104. Id. at 1075.
105. Id.
106. In re Olsen, 221 Cal. Rptr. 772 (Ct. App. 1986).
107. In re Edward S., 183 Cal. Rptr. 773 (Ct. App. 1982).
108. In re Adrian 0., 202 Cal. Rptr. 287,290 (Ct. App. 1984); In re Joyleaf W., 198 Cal.
Rptr. 114, 115 (Ct. App. 1984).
dency proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code Section
300,109 conservatorship proceedings, 110 and paternity proceedings."'
The burden placed upon the appellate courts as a result of Wende
is increasing and clearly disproportionate to the likelihood or level of
any possible error. Justice Anderson correctly notes, "Wende review
is thus just one more obstacle in the peculiar California judicial land-
scape" that introduces unnecessary delay into the appellate process. 112
Wende must be reconsidered in light of subsequent federal deci-
sions interpreting the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court's deci-
sion in McCoy v. Court of Appeals"13 strongly suggests that the Wende
procedure is not compelled by Anders v. California.114 Even more
significantly, in United States v. Griffy,115 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals squarely held that a Wende brief unconstitutionally denies
the appellant effective assistance of counsel under Anders, that a
proper Anders brief must contain legal analysis with citations to au-
thorities establishing that the appeal is meritless, and that an Anders
brief must be accompanied by a motion to withdraw as counsel. An
extended analysis of these cases is beyond the scope of this Article,
but both cases raise serious doubts regarding the constitutionality of
the Wende procedure.
Even assuming that the procedure in Griffy were to become the
law in California, the effect upon the court of appeal or upon the
state's finances remains unclear. Griffy still requires the court of ap-
peal to review the record itself to determine whether to grant coun-
sel's motion to withdraw. The court of appeal would undoubtedly
discharge that obligation in much the same way that it now discharges
its independent review obligation under Wende. In effect, there may
be no net savings in the time it takes the court of appeal to review.
And, since a Griffy brief is much more substantial than a Wende brief,
it would probably cost the state more to compensate appointed coun-
sel to take a Griffy appeal than a Wende appeal. On the other hand,
discussions with federal public defenders suggest that the burden of
drafting a Griffy brief, as well as the ethical dilemma posed by filing a
brief that explains why the appeal is meritless, may deter appointed
109. In re Brian B., 190 Cal. Rptr. 153, 154 (Ct. App. 1983); In re Jesse H., 178 Cal.
Rptr. 205, 206 (Ct. App. 1981).
110. Conservatorship of Besoyan, 226 Cal. Rptr. 196 (Ct. App. 1986).
111. County of Madera v. Jacobson, 229 Cal. Rptr. 602 (Ct. App. 1987).
112. Anderson, supra note 94, at 339.
113. McCoy, 486 U.S. at 429.
114. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
115. 895 F.2d 561, 562, appeal dismissed without op., 904 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1990).
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counsel from filing such a brief. Additionally, appointed counsel
would be more likely, faced with the problems associated with prepar-
ing a Griffy brief, to find at least one arguably appealable issue, which
might result in a substantial reduction in the number of Wende-Griffy
appeals.
C. Determining Whether the Appeal Qualifies for Special Treatment
When briefing is complete, an appeal is ready for initial screening
and processing by the appellate court. This initial screening, usually
performed by a staff attorney under supervision of the presiding
judge, but sometimes performed by a judge, gives the appellate court
an opportunity to determine the most appropriate form of appellate
treatment for the case. Appellate courts around the country, includ-
ing those in California, have been experimenting for several years
with alternative appellate dispute resolution, the most common form
of which is the pre-argument settlement conference. 116
The overall merits of the pre-argument settlement conference are
still being debated, although initial results are certainly promising.117
A recent survey covering forty-five appellate courts in twenty-five
states indicates seventeen courts have adopted the practice, twenty-
two appellate courts have never tried it, and six courts rejected the
pre-argument settlement conference after experimenting with it.118
In California, the Third District Court of Appeal has had a settle-
ment conference program in place for almost twenty years. During
the last four years, the court held conferences in about one-third of its
civil appeals. Slightly more than forty percent of those conferences
resulted in a settlement (for a total 295 settled appeals). Other dis-
tricts have similar programs in effect.
Appellate courts should continue to experiment with decision-
making models that use less appellate resources than the traditional
model. The pre-argument settlement conference is already accepted
as one way to quickly resolve appeals.
116. See, e.g., Irving R. Kaufman, Reform for a System in Crisis: Alternative Dispute
Resolution in the Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L. Rnv. 1 (1990); Irving R. Kaufman, Must
Every Appeal Run the Gamut?-The Civil Appeals Management Plan, 95 YALE L.J. 755,
761 (1986); James B. Eaglin, The Pre-Argument Conference Program in the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals: An Evaluation, FED. JUD. CENTER (1990).
117. For a favorable review, see Wendy Cole Lascher, Appellate Settlements, L.A.
LAW., Aug.-Sept. 1990, at 46.
118. These results were reported to the author by Professor Maurice Rosenberg of the
Columbia University School of Law.
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D. Arguing Before a Panel of Judges
Appellate review in the United States has traditionally included
the right to have counsel appear in person before the appellate tribu-
nal to present oral arguments for the court's consideration. In the
golden age of oral advocacy, the courts would sometimes listen for
hours or even days to the arguments of counsel. However, that
golden age has passed; courts around the country are reducing the
time allotted for oral argument. Rising caseloads and the decreasing
usefulness of oral argument (compared to written briefs) are the as-
serted reasons. 119
At its best, oral argument is an informed interchange between
well-prepared counsel and a well-informed, actively engaged bench.
Judges can use oral argument to test their theories of the case and the
law and to press counsel to address points deftly avoided in the briefs.
Justices also use oral argument to seek support from a colleague.
Counsel use oral argument to emphasize the most critical points for
the court's consideration. At its worst, oral argument is a stale rehash
of exactly what appears in the briefs. This unfortunate consequence is
usually the result of counsel who are unable or unwilling to engage in
meaningful dialogue with judges who have already decided the case
and do not believe oral argument is necessary in any event.
Sadly, it appears the average oral argument in the court of appeal
is closer to the worst-case scenario. Part of the problem is lack of
education; teaching oral advocacy skills is not a central part of any law
school curriculum, and lawyers in practice get little direct feedback
from the courts. But counsel are not entirely at fault. Because of
heavy caseloads and the ninety-day rule, 20 appellate courts prepare
opinions prior to oral argument, a process known as "front-load-
ing."' 12 ' As a result, in such cases judges are listening to oral argu-
ments after having concluded their research, analysis, and drafting.
Unless the court tips its hand in oral argument with very specific ques-
tions, counsel may be unaware of what issues, if any, remain open for
discussion.
119. It also is doubtful that oral argument is useful in the vast majority of meritless (but
not frivolous) appeals, yet counsel continue to insist upon oral argument in many of these
cases.
120. "A judge of a court of record may not receive the salary for the judicial office held
by the judge while any cause before the judge remains pending and undetermined for 90
days after it has been submitted for decision." CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, § 19.
121. Anderson, supra note 94, at 342.
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In response to this problem, the court of appeal might routinely
release tentative opinions prior to oral argument, at least in cases in
which the final opinion probably will not be published. Such tentative
opinions would focus attention upon the precise reasoning the court
appears ready to adopt in the case. They may also make oral argu-
ment a more lively experience. Division Two of the Fourth District
Court of Appeal has been releasing tentative opinions for several
years. Both bench and bar have found the experiment to be success-
ful. The Appellate Department of the Superior Court for the County
of Los Angeles also issues tentative opinions prior to oral argument.
All appellate courts in California should consider releasing tentative
decisions in at least some cases.
There are, of course, some cases in which no amount of oral ad-
vocacy could possibly change the result. Appellate courts in Califor-
nia, however, cannot deny oral argument over the objections of the
parties. Counsel have an absolute right to demand oral argument.122
Counsel may waive argument, however, and the court of appeal now
routinely requests waiver in many cases with a letter to counsel.123
Because the waiver letters give no specific reason for the request,
some counsel view the letters "with caution."' 24
One solution to this problem-and a solution that might increase
the number of cases in which counsel waives argument-would be to
include with the request for waiver a copy of the court's tentative
opinion. Thus, the decision whether or not to have oral argument
would be left entirely up to the losing party, who would then have a
firm basis for deciding whether oral argument would be likely to
change the court's mind. This proposal essentially converts oral argu-
ment from an integral part of the initial decision-making process into
something more like an oral petition for rehearing. But for all practi-
cal purposes, that is what California appellate courts are doing today
in most cases. So long as the appellate courts maintain objectivity,
this proposal could reduce the time spent in useless oral arguments
and improve the focus and quality of remaining oral arguments.
Oral arguments might be modified in one additional respect. All
districts could follow the lead set by the First (San Francisco) and
Fifth (Fresno) Districts in permitting counsel to argue by teleconfer-
122. Moles v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 187 Cal. Rptr. 557,560 (Ct. App. 1982); People
v. Brigham, 157 Cal. Rptr. 905, 907 (Ct. App. 1979).
123. Anderson, supra note 94, at 346-47.
124. Id at 347.
ence. 125 Although teleconferencing deprives the justices and lawyers
of one another's personal appearances, the experience in San Fran-
cisco and Fresno has been that many counsel give a better prepared
and more tightly reasoned argument by telephone than they do in per-
son.126 For many lawyers, standing in front of a panel of three robed
judges may be an intimidating experience, somewhat reminiscent of
the pressures felt in law school. That sort of apprehension interferes
with the presentation of the best possible arguments. A teleargument,
by contrast, is much more familiar territory for most lawyers. Law-
yers, after all, spend much of their time on the telephone talking to or
arguing with people.
There are also significant economic reasons for adopting optional
teleargument. As noted by Justice Anderson, the San Francisco and
Fresno courts found "[t]he purchase and installation costs of the tele-
phonic equipment were recovered in just two months through savings
achieved by avoiding the necessity of physical appearance of ap-
pointed counsel for indigent criminal appellants. 1 27 Practitioners will
realize significant savings from teleargument as well. The reduction in
traffic to and from appellate courts will have some minor, though per-
haps highly visible, impact on parking and pollution levels. The Judi-
cial Council should encourage teleargument in all six court of appeal
districts.128
E. Reaching a Decision
The heart of the appellate system is the decision-making process.
No matter how well or how smoothly everything else functions, if ap-
pellate courts reach incorrect results in too many cases, public confi-
dence in the judicial system diminishes. The critical importance of the
125. Id. At present, both districts use relatively simple audio telephonic processes
only. Although purely audio oral argument is unsatisfactory to many lawyers, who prefer
to see all parties and activity, and especially the three justices, technology will soon permit
full-motion, real-time, high-definition video. Ultimately, advances in telecommunication
and the creation of "virtual realities" will entirely replace actual presence. Virtual reality
will be the next best thing to being there.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. After several years of experience at the court of appeal level and evaluation and
refinement of the necessary technologies, consideration could be given to permitting
telearguments at the supreme court. Telearguments at the supreme court level present
different issues because of the increased size of the court and the importance of the ques-
tions considered at that level.
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decision-making process explains in large measure why scholars and
judges have focused so much intellectual attention upon it.129
Appellate courts do not sit abstractly to review principles of
law.'30 In one sense, the supreme court's primary function is to guide
the development of the law in California. But it performs this func-
tion only in the context of deciding actual controversies between liti-
gants. The court of appeal may have a primary responsibility of
correcting trial court errors, but that function is subordinate to resolv-
ing how the particular case should be decided. Ultimately, then, ap-
pellate courts-no less than trial courts-have one overarching
function: to decide cases.13'
In California, appellate courts may set aside a trial court judg-
ment only when "the court shall be of the opinion that the error com-
plained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice."' 32 Under this
provision, an appellate court must first determine whether the trial
court committed an error and then determine whether that error was
prejudicial. 133
(1) Standards of Appellate Review
In evaluating allegations of error, appellate courts adopt a "stan-
dard of appellate review" appropriate for the type of tribunal from
which appeal is being taken, the type of proceeding held in that tribu-
nal, the type of issue being raised on appeal, and the abilities of the
appellate tribunal. In the great majority of appeals from trial court
judgments, California appellate courts apply, as appropriate, one or
all of the following standards of review: (a) independent (de novo)
review; (b) substantial evidence review; and (c) abuse of discretion
review.
129. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1921); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949); KARL LLEW-
ELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960).
130. Pacific Legal Found. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 188 Cal. Rptr. 104,111-13 (Ct.
App. 1982).
131. See Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119, 124 (Cal. 1992) (emphasizing
this paramount function--"[t]he primary purpose of the public judiciary is 'to afford a
forum for the settlement of litigable matters between disputing parties"' (quoting Vechi v.
Sorensen, 310 P.2d 1020, 1021 (Cal. 1959))).
132. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 13.
133. See id.
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a. Independent (De Novo) Review
When an appellate court employs independent (de novo) review,
it generally gives no special deference to the findings or conclusions of
the court from which the appeal is taken. The appellate court uses its
own independent judgment to resolve the issue or issues presented for
consideration.
The independent review standard does not require the appellate
court to discard or ignore the reasoned conclusions of the lower court.
To the contrary, the good work of the lower court is often of great
benefit to the appellate court, as is proven by the number of rulings
affirmed, often on the basis of the same reasoning employed by the
lower court. Independent review does not mean uninformed or en-
tirely new review; appellate courts are not required to reinvent the
wheel already constructed partially or fully by the lower court.
Independent review does mean, however, the appellate court is
not constrained to give the lower court's conclusions any particular
weight. If the appellate court believes the lower court erred, it need
find nothing more, subject to the independent requirement that the
error be prejudicial. The appellate court need not find, for example,
that the error is "clear" or "manifest." It is enough that the appellate
court disagrees with the lower tribunal's conclusion, and the appellate
court is thus free to substitute its judgment for that of the lower
tribunal.
Independent review is most commonly used to review the lower
tribunal's resolution of legal issues.134 It is in the consideration of
purely legal questions that an appellate court usually has a significant
advantage over the tribunal from which the appeal has been taken.
This advantage justifies giving little or no weight to the lower court's
conclusions. Quoting extensively from the Ninth Circuit's decision in
United States v. McConney,135 the California Supreme Court in People
v. Louis136 explained as follows:
Structurally, appellate courts have several advantages over trial
courts in deciding questions of law. First, appellate judges are freer
to concentrate on legal questions because they are not encumbered,
as are trial judges, by the vital, but time-consuming, process of hear-
ing evidence. Second, the judgment of at least three members of an
appellate panel is brought to bear on every case. It stands to reason
134. The independent review standard overlaps somewhat with the abuse of discretion
standard because a lower tribunal abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.
135. 728 F.2d 1195, 1200-04 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984).
136. 728 P.2d 180 (Cal. 1986).
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that the collaborative, deliberative process of appellate courts
reduces the risk of judicial error on questions of law....
[Independent] review of questions of law, however, is dictated
by still another concern. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, appel-
late rulings of law become controlling precedent and, consequently,
affect the rights of future litigants. Rulings on factual issues, on the
other hand, are generally of concern only to the immediate litigants.
From the standpoint of sound judicial administration, therefore, it
makes sense to concentrate appellate resources on ensuring the cor-
rectness of determinations of law.137
The most obvious examples of purely legal questions involve the
interpretation of constitutional or statutory provisions or other
sources of positive law.138 Questions of law often involve the interpre-
tation of other types of legally significant writings. For example, a
demurrer challenges the legal sufficiency of the written pleadings. A
motion for summary judgment raises the legal issue of whether, on the
pleadings and other written submissions, a fact question is presented
for the jury.139 And the interpretation of an unambiguous, written
contract is usually considered to present a purely legal question. 140
Legal questions can also be presented by nondocumentary evi-
dence, of course, although it is much more likely that nondocumen-
tary evidence will raise fact questions. Cases involving the
interpretation of writings more often present legal questions because
there is usually no dispute about the words that have been written.
Thus, the underlying facts are not in dispute, and the dispute relates
only to the legal interpretation or consequences of those facts. By
contrast, when nondocumentary evidence is involved, such as testi-
mony about what one party remembers seeing or hearing, a dispute
about the underlying facts is much more common, and a fact question
is thus much more likely to be presented.
When the parties agree in the trial court on the underlying facts,
it might seem to present a purely legal question. However, courts
have refused routinely to characterize the legal interpretation of un-
disputed, nondocumentary facts as presenting pure questions of law.
Instead, courts often describe such issues as involving the application
137. Id. at 189-90.
138. Olson v. Cory, 673 P.2d 720, 728 (Cal. 1983).
139. Saldana v. Globe-Weis Sys. Co., 285 Cal. Rptr. 385, 388-90 (Ct. App. 1991) (Fifth
District Court of Appeal). The Second and Third Districts have held that an abuse of
discretion standard may apply to a trial court's decision on a motion for summary judg-
ment. Dominigue v. Presley of S. Cal., 243 Cal. Rptr. 312, 313 (Ct. App. 1988) (Second
District); Hoffman v. Citadel Gen. Assur., Ltd., 240 Cal. Rptr. 253, 256 (Ct. App. 1987)
(Third District).
140. Winet v. Price, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 554, 557 (Ct. App. 1992).
of the law to the facts or as raising mixed questions of fact and law. 141
Appellate courts review such issues under either the independent re-
view or the substantial evidence standard, depending upon whether
the issue involves predominately legal or factual questions. The Ninth
Circuit in McConney explained:
The appropriate standard of review for a [trial] judge's application
of law to fact may be determined, in our view, by reference to the
sound principles which underlie the settled rules of appellate review
[regarding facts and law separately]. If the concerns of judicial ad-
ministration-efficiency, accuracy, and precedential weight-make
it more appropriate for a judge to determine whether the estab-
lished facts fall within the relevant legal definition, we should sub-
ject his determination to deferential, clearly erroneous review. If,
on the other hand, the concerns of judicial administration favor the
appellate court, we should subject the [trial] judge's finding to de
novo review. Thus, in each case, the pivotal question is do the con-
cerns of judicial administration favor the [trial] court or do they
favor the appellate court.
In our view, the key to the resolution of this question is the
nature of the inquiry that is required to decide "whether the rule of
law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated." If appli-
cation of the rule of law to the facts requires an inquiry that is "es-
sentially factual,"-one that is founded "on the application of the
fact-finding tribunal's experience with the mainsprings of human
conduct,"-the concerns of judicial administration will favor the
[trial] court, and the [trial] court's determination should be classi-
fied as one of fact reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard.
If, on the other hand, the question requires us to consider legal con-
cepts in the mix of fact and law and to exercise judgment about the
values that animate legal principles, then the concerns of judicial
administration will favor the appellate court, and the question
should be classified as one of law and reviewed de novo.142
For example, consistent with this analysis, courts hold that the exist-
ence of a duty of care is generally a legal question for the court, 43
while the issue of whether the duty has been breached is generally a
factual question for the fact finder.144
The independent review standard as applied in California appears
to advance each of the goals identified above for appellate review.
Independent review certainly furthers the error correction goal, and it
equally furthers the important goal of using appellate courts to deter-
141. For example, the issue of whether a duty of reasonable care has been breached is
usually treated as a fact question for the jury. 6 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW, TORTS § 749 (9th ed. 1987).
142. McConney, 728 F.2d at 1202 (citations omitted).
143. Scott v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810, 811 (Ct. App. 1992).
144. Id. at 812.
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mine the law as it should be applied in subsequent cases. Independent
review also insures some level of consistency in the interpretation of
legal questions. Finally, independent review strongly furthers the goal
of securing public confidence in the judicial system. Ultimate respon-
sibility under the independent review standard appropriately lies with
the highest judicial tribunal in the state. There is no justification for
having the California Supreme Court defer to a lower court's interpre-
tation of a purely legal question.
In sum, there is no reason to alter the California appellate court's
approach to the independent review standard.
b. Substantial Evidence Review
Under the substantial evidence standard, an appellate court will
not reverse the findings of the lower tribunal-findings either by the
judge or the jury' 45-so long as there is substantial evidence in the
record to support the finding. The substantial evidence standard is
not satisfied by the existence of "any" evidence in support of the find-
ing, but the evidence must be of "ponderable legal significance, rea-
sonable in nature, credible, and of solid value."'1 46 Even if there is
substantial evidence to support a reversal, the appellate court must
affirm as long as there is substantial evidence to support the lower
court's finding. 47 The substantial evidence standard is used primarily
in the review of factual determinations and those mixed questions of
law and fact in which factual elements predominate.
Quoting again from the Ninth Circuit decision in McConney, the
California Supreme Court explained the rationale for a deferential re-
view of factual findings:
[The] mandate that appellate courts disturb not a trial court's find-
ings of fact unless clearly erroneous serves two policy objectives.
First, it minimizes the risk of judicial error by assigning primary re-
sponsibility for resolving factual disputes to the court in the "supe-
rior position" to evaluate and weigh the evidence-the trial
court.... Second, because under the clearly erroneous test, the re-
viewing court will affirm the trial court's determinations unless it "is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed," [citation], it is relieved of the burden of a full-scale in-
dependent review and evaluation of the evidence. Consequently,
145. Alderson v. Alderson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 610, 618 (Ct. App. 1986) (quoting Crawford
v. Southern Pac. Co., 45 P.2d 183, 184 (Cal. 1935)).
146. People v. Johnson, 606 P.2d 738, 750 (Cal. 1980).
147. Bowers v. Bernards, 197 Cal. Rptr. 925, 927 (Ct. App. 1984).
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valuable appellate resources are conserved for those issues that ap-
pellate courts in turn are best situated to decide. 148
Because the "substantial evidence" standard is so deferential to the
lower tribunal's findings, it is to be expected that there will be few
cases in which a court of appeal will reverse on the ground of no sub-
stantial evidence to support the trial court's findings.
A quick search of published opinions confirms this common-
sense intuition. In 1992, there were only a few published opinions in
which the appellate courts have held that the trial court's findings
were not supported by substantial evidence. 149 Searching only pub-
lished opinions understates the number of "no substantial evidence"
reversals because those decisions usually are very fact-based and are
thus less likely to satisfy California's standards for publication. 150
Nevertheless, discussions with appellate justices confirm that "no sub-
stantial evidence" reversals are uncommon in both published and un-
published cases.
Given the small number of cases in which substantial evidence
review produces a reversal, it is appropriate to consider whether the
costs of factual review by appellate courts are worth the benefit, espe-
cially when the appellate court's expertise lies in reviewing legal
rather than factual questions. The costs of substantial evidence review
involve lawyer time in preparing complete transcripts, reviewing tran-
scripts, and making detailed factual arguments. The court must also
spend time reviewing briefs and transcripts and drafting detailed opin-
ions setting forth the substantial evidence that supported (or the lack
of evidence that did not support) the lower court's judgment. In addi-
tion, because the court of appeal is far removed from the trial process
and must work from a cold record, there is an additional cost involved
148. People v. Louis, 728 P.2d 180, 189 (Cal. 1986) (quoting United States v. McCon-
ney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 1984)).
149. In People v. Ceja, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 47 (Ct. App. 1992), rev'd, 847 P.2d 55 (Cal.
1993), the court of appeal held that there was no substantial evidence to support a finding
that murder was committed by lying in wait, but that decision was reversed by the supreme
court. In several cases, the court of appeal held that there was no substantial evidence to
support an administrative agency's determination. In two of those cases, the trial court had
already made the same determination. Newman v. State Personnel Bd., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d
601, 605-06 (Ct. App. 1992); Los Angeles County Dep't of Parks & Recreation v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 150, 153-57 (Ct. App. 1992). In two other cases, the trial
court had incorrectly held that substantial evidence existed. Sierra Club v. Contra Costa
County, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182, 189 (Ct. App. 1992); Martinez v. City of San Diego, 4 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 753, 759 (Ct. App. 1992) (depublished). In People v. Williams, 841 P.2d 961 (Cal.
1992), the supreme court held there was no substantial evidence to warrant an instruction
on the defense of mistaken belief of consent in a rape case.
150. See CAL. CT. R. 976.
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in the risk that the court of appeal will incorrectly substitute its judg-
ment on the facts for the judgment of the trial court, thereby reaching
a wrong decision.
The benefits of substantial evidence review are negligible. In the
very few cases reversed for lack of substantial evidence, the appellate
goal of error correction would certainly be advanced. But reversals
for lack of substantial evidence advance that goal only incrementally.
Because of the substantial evidence rule, reversals occur only in the
most obvious and egregious cases of error.
It may be that the mere possibility of reversal on factual grounds
operates as a check upon trial courts. If a trial court knew there were
no review whatsoever of factual determinations, a trial court seeking
to insulate its judgment from appellate review might consciously at-
tempt to frame more issues as involving factual determinations. It is
speculative, however, whether any trial court would actually attempt
such a subterfuge. It is equally speculative whether any such attempt
ultimately could be successful. After all, the characterization of an
issue as involving a question of law or fact is itself a legal determina-
tion; thus it is unlikely a trial court could successfully convert legal
questions into factual questions.
In the last analysis, substantial evidence review may be justifiable
primarily to achieve the appellate goal of promoting public trust in the
judicial system. An appellate system that denied any review of factual
determinations-no matter how erroneous those determinations
were-would be subject to severe public criticism. That criticism
probably would be heard most in the context of appeals from criminal
convictions because they involve situations in which a person's liberty
or life is at stake. Reviews of this Article by judges, civil practitioners,
criminal practitioners, and scholars were almost unanimous in defense
of the "substantial evidence" standard and in rejection of any propo-
sal to reduce appellate review of factual questions.
Notwithstanding these objections, some further study seems war-
ranted to evaluate the merits of denying the appellate courts the
power to review for factual error or replacing the "substantial evi-
dence" standard with a "no evidence" standard of review.151 A com-
parative study of jurisdictions adopting these approaches could reveal
151. Under a "no evidence" standard, any supporting evidence whatsoever in the rec-
ord would be sufficient to uphold a lower court's factual findings. Under this approach,
the appellate courts would still be able to exercise some control over a lower court's factual
determinations, but appeals on that ground would be further deterred by the extremely
deferential standard of review being applied.
some of the benefits and risks associated with different levels of appel-
late factual review. The Judicial Council should prevail upon Califor-
nia's law schools to undertake such a study.
In the future, we may expect greater pressure on appellate courts
in the opposite direction, toward independent appellate review of fac-
tual questions. This pressure will begin building as soon as the cold,
dry reporter's transcript is replaced by a "hot" video transcript of all
trial court proceedings. When the appellate court is presented with a
full video record of the trial, appellants will argue the appellate court
is in just as good a position as the trial court to assess credibility of
witnesses and to weigh the evidence. Scholars are already making the
case for greater appellate court intervention in such circumstances. 152
Yet it is questionable whether appellate resources are well-spent in
retrying cases. There is little reason to believe an appellate court
would actually do a better job of judging such issues than a trial judge.
Moreover, the availability of independent review of factual issues
would undoubtedly encourage many more trial court losers to file ap-
peals focused upon very narrow, case-specific factual questions. Any
tendency to expand appellate court review of factual determinations
should be resisted.
c. Abuse of Discretion Review
An appellate court will reverse a lower court's exercise of discre-
tion only upon a showing of "clear abuse of discretion." A trial court
abuses its discretion if it acts contrary to law or if there is no substan-
tial evidence to support the factual determinations on which the dis-
cretion was exercised. 153 In this way, the abuse of discretion standard
incorporates both the independent review and substantial evidence
standards. So long as the trial court has substantial evidence to sup-
port its factual determinations, and it has not committed an error of
law, the appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
lower tribunal. A clear abuse exists only if the tribunal "exercised its
discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that
resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice."'1 54 The tribunal must
152. See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 509, 546-
50 (1992).
153. Shamblin v. Brattain, 749 P.2d 339, 341 (Cal. 1988).
154. People v. Jordan, 721 P.2d 79, 83 (Cal. 1986); see 9 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE §§ 275-277 (3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE].
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have exceeded the bounds of reason, taking into account all of the
circumstances before it.155
There is an enormous number of discretionary judicial decisions
made during trial. A partial list includes changes of venue, dismissal
or stay for forum non conveniens, provisional remedies such as pre-
liminary injunctions, dismissal for lack of prosecution, orders granting
motions for continuance, many evidentiary rulings, and new trial
orders.156
The highly deferential abuse of discretion standard appears to
further all of the goals of appellate review. When a judge has made a
legal error in the course of exercising discretion, that legal error is
corrected under the independent review standard, which furthers the
error correction goal and promotes uniformity in the law. Apart from
legal errors in the exercise of discretion, however, little useful purpose
would be served by carefully scrutinizing the sort of decisions subject
to the abuse of discretion standard. As the above list indicates, a trial
judge's discretion is concentrated in procedural and administrative
matters. While these matters are potentially of great practical impor-
tance to the parties, they raise few public policy concerns and just as
few concerns about the correctness of the ultimate judgment in the
case. For example, granting a motion for continuance has virtually no
public policy implications and, in theory, should not affect the result in
a case.
Some discretionary rulings, such as rulings to exclude or admit
evidence, are much more likely to affect the outcome of the case,
which may raise a concern that the abuse of discretion standard inter-
feres with the appellate court's error-correcting function. On the
other hand, appellate justices are usually in a poor position to deter-
mine whether, for example, the introduction of a particular piece of
evidence might be unduly prejudicial in the context of an ongoing
trial, or whether the introduction of proffered testimony is cumulative.
Appellate justices' feel for the context of the trial is necessarily more
remote and indirect than that of the trial judge. In these circum-
stances, appellate justices may be even more prone to error than a
trial judge. A deferential standard of review is thus appropriate at the
appellate level.
155. Denham v. Superior Ct., 468 P.2d 193, 197 (Cal. 1970).
156. 9 WrrKiN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, supra note 154, § 276.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
d. Harmless Error
Identifying an error committed by the lower tribunal does not
trigger a reversal in all cases. The California Constitution generally
prohibits reversal of either a civil or criminal judgment for error un-
less "the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has
resulted in a miscarriage of justice."'1 57 Similar provisions may be
found in the Evidence Code,158 Penal Code,159 and Code of Civil Pro-
cedure. 160 The Supreme Court of the United States has likewise de-
veloped a complex "harmless error" doctrine applicable in review of
constitutional errors. 16'
Historically, harmless error provisions were a reaction to the
overly technical courts of the nineteenth century, which routinely re-
versed high numbers of cases when they found any error in the pro-
ceedings, no matter how trivial. Justice Traynor cites as an example of
this regrettable tendency the decision in People v. St. Clair,162 in which
the court found reversible error in an indictment charging the defend-
ant with breaking and entering with intent to commit "larcey" (rather
than "larceny"). 163 Although no one would seriously advocate a re-
turn to that type of hypertechnicality, the burdens that the harmless
error doctrine imposes upon appellate courts are serious enough to
prompt consideration of whether there are better ways of handling at
least some categories of harmless error.
The harmless error doctrine creates several types of burdens
upon appellate courts. First, it takes significant time for the appellate
court to engage in a harmless error analysis. In order to do it well, the
court must immerse itself in the complete record. There is no appar-
157. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 13, provides in full as follows:
No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground
of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence,
or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of
procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evi-
dence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted
in a miscarriage of justice.
158. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 353, 354 (West 1966).
159. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1258, 1404 (West 1982).
160. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 475 (West 1979).
161. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081 (1993); Arizona v. Fulmi-
nante, 499 U.S. 279, 295-302 (1991) (stating the general rule that constitutional error does
not automatically require reversal of conviction and recognizing most constitutional errors
can be harmful); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (holding that before a
constitutional error can be harmful, the court must be able to declare its belief that the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
162. People v. St. Clair, 56 Cal. 406 (1880).
163. ROGER TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 3-4 (1970).
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ent alternative way for a court to determine whether, absent the erro-
neous exclusion or introduction of a particular piece of evidence, it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to appellant would
have occurred. 16
Second, in considering whether an error is harmless, the appellate
court is required to do more than merely search for "substantial evi-
dence" in support of the judgment. The court is supposed to come to
a judgment about the probabilities that the error affected the out-
come. Yet that is precisely the sort of speculative inquiry into the fac-
tual basis of a judgment that appellate tribunals are relatively ill-
equipped to perform.
Third, the harmless error doctrine would seem to undermine the
appellate court's error correction function and to encourage essen-
tially useless appeals.165 Characterizing an error as harmless sends a
very mixed signal to the bench and bar. On the one hand, the court
has found an error, but on the other hand, it appears to be an error
that the lower tribunal is permitted to make. In that sense, it is not an
error at all.' 66 And, if it is not really an error (or, more properly, not
an error to which serious consequences attach), then there is no rea-
son for the lower tribunal to avoid that error in the future. In this
way, the harmless error doctrine may actually perpetuate avoidable,
repetitive errors by lower courts, errors that form the basis for more
appeals in the future. This consequence, in turn, undermines the ap-
pellate court's goal of achieving uniformity in the application of the
law by lower courts and, more importantly, may significantly under-
mine the public's confidence in the judicial system. 67
The somewhat schizophrenic approach to appellate review cre-
ated by the harmless error doctrine is nicely illustrated in the recent
164. See, e.g., Pool v. City of Oakland, 728 P.2d 1163,1173-74 (Cal. 1986) (stating that a
miscarriage of justice should only be declared when the court has examined the entire case
and believes it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to appellant would have
been reached in the absence of error).
165. The appeal is "useless" in the sense that, although an error has occurred, the ap-
pellant gets no significant relief. Yet, the appellant is still encouraged to file the appeal
because an error actually did occur.
166. Somewhat cynically, but perhaps accurately, the harmless error doctrine has been
described by some as the judiciary's version of "close is good enough for government
work." Cf Nasir v. Sacramento County Office of the Dist. Attorney, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694,
700 (Ct. App. 1992) (denying order to repossess when district attorney filed an incomplete
notice of repossession).
167. Willis L.M. Reese, Book Review, 71 COLUM. L. Rnv. 527, 527-28 (1971) (review-
ing TRAYNOR, supra note 163).
California Supreme Court opinion, People v. Howard.168 Before ac-
cepting a guilty plea, the trial court failed to secure from the defend-
ant an explicit waiver of the constitutional right against self-
incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one's
accusers. In Howard, a capital case, the defendant admitted to the
court prior to trial a special circumstances allegation that he had
served a prison term for burglary within the preceding five years. 169
The trial court used the admission to enhance the defendant's noncap-
ital sentence.170 On appeal the defendant asserted the trial court
erred in accepting his admission without advising him on the record of
his privilege against self-incrimination. 171
The court agreed that "the trial court clearly erred," but, after a
review of federal cases, concluded the error was not reversible per se
and was subject to a harmless error analysis.172 Applying that analy-
sis, the court concluded the trial court's error was harmless because
the record demonstrated that the admission was "voluntary and intel-
ligent" despite the absence of an explicit admonition on the privilege
against self-incrimination. 173 Yet the court was plainly concerned that
lower courts might misinterpret its affirmance. Notwithstanding the
affirmance, the court issued the following caution:
This does not mean that explicit admonitions and waivers are no
longer an important part of the process of accepting a plea of guilty
or an admission of a prior conviction. Despite the rejection of [In re
Tahi] as a matter of federal law, explicit admonitions and waivers
still serve the purpose that originally led us to require them: They
are the only realistic means of assuring that the judge leaves a rec-
ord adequate for review.... Moreover, the essential wisdom of ex-
plicit waivers remains beyond question....
For these reasons we emphasize that explicit admonitions and
waivers are still required in this state. 174
Yet the court affirmed the judgment, and while explicit admonitions
and waivers are "required," the failure to give them may have no
consequences.
Is there anything more that appellate courts can do to reduce the
number of errors ultimately categorized as harmless without returning
to the hypertechnical jurisprudence of the nineteenth century? To be-
168. 824 P.2d 1315 (Cal.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 383 (1992).
169. Id. at 1339.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1342.
174. Id. (citations omitted).
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gin, more needs to be known about the causes and categories of harm-
less error; very little is known about harmless error, apart from
generalizations that it is often invoked in cases involving the errone-
ous admission or exclusion of evidence and in cases involving jury in-
structions. 7 5 Precisely what types of evidentiary mistakes are courts
making? Are the errors concentrated in any one area of the law of
evidence, such as hearsay? What types of instructional errors are oc-
curring? Are these errors that could be avoided by promulgating
clearer pattern jury instructions?
A one- or multi-year study of harmless error might give the ap-
pellate courts a much better understanding of the exact contours of
the problem and how it best can be addressed. The Judicial Council
should prevail upon California's law schools to conduct such a study.
Assuming this research discloses avoidable, repetitive harmless
errors, several possible approaches to prevent such errors stand out.
First, judicial education efforts through the California Center for Judi-
cial Education and Research should be focused upon these types of
errors. Second, to the extent these errors may be avoided by the ad-
ministrative adoption of rules of procedure, forms of practice, scripts,
or pattern jury instructions, such administrative action should be
taken. Third, appellate courts should consider classifying certain
types of avoidable errors as harmless today, but harmful tomorrow,
which is very close to what the court was doing in People v. Howard.
Such classification would, in essence, put lower courts on notice that
certain types of avoidable errors will no longer be considered harm-
less, something akin to a one-bite rule.1 76 These "error reduction" ac-
tivities could substantially reduce the number of cases in which
appellate courts are forced to use the harmless error doctrine.
e. Review of Administrative Decisions
Because of the explosive growth of the administrative state, a
substantial quantity of legislative and judicial activity is now under-
taken by people who are neither legislators nor judges. Although it
has become customary to refer to such administrative action as either
quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial, administrative decisions are not
175. More than 90% of all appellate court opinions are unpublished. 1 1993 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 13, at 31. Thus, the overwhelming bulk of appellate analysis of trial
court error goes unknown and largely unknowable by the bar at large and by the public.
176. This goal could be accomplished doctrinally by declaring the error to be harmful,
but applying that decision prospectively only.
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quasi-decisions; they are very real decisions that may have statewide
impacts.
Judicial review of administrative action depends upon what type
of action is being reviewed-whether rule-making or adjudicatory-
and upon what type of agency is acting-specially authorized state
agencies, other state agencies, or local agencies. Quasi-legislative de-
terminations must conform to procedures required by law, but other-
wise are reviewed to determine if the agency action was arbitrary,
capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support.177 This deferen-
tial standard "is grounded upon the doctrine of separation of powers
which (1) sanctions legislative delegation of authority to an appropri-
ate administrative agency and (2) acknowledges the presumed exper-
tise of the agency.1178 Quasi-judicial determinations are reviewed
under an "abuse of discretion" standard. 79
In the course of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial determina-
tions, agencies often interpret the statutes that have created and au-
thorized the agency to act. Because an agency is presumed to possess
expertise, courts use a "clearly erroneous" standard to review a state
agency's contemporaneous interpretation of its authorizing statutes.
Under this standard, a court will attach "great weight" to the agency's
contemporaneous administrative interpretation and will reverse that
interpretation only if the court determines the interpretation is
"clearly erroneous."'180
California courts have not precisely defined what the "clearly er-
roneous" standard means. It is more deferential than the independent
review standard, and it appears to be less deferential than the substan-
tial evidence standard, although this relationship is much less cer-
tain.' 8 ' The United States Supreme Court has defined "clearly
erroneous" to mean that if after looking at all the evidence the re-
177. 8 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, supra note 154, § 250.
178. Stauffer Chemical Co. v. Air Resources Bd., 180 Cal. Rptr. 550, 553-54 (Ct. App.
1982) (citing California Hotel & Motel Assoc. v. International Welfare Comm'n, 599 P.2d
31, 38 (Cal. 1979)).
179. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5(b) (West Supp. 1993). As Witkin explains, trial
courts sometimes use an "independent judgment" rule, WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE,
supra note 154, § 254, and sometimes use a "substantial evidence" rule to review factual
determinations, id. § 255. The choice, made on a case-by-case basis, depends upon the type
of agency, the statute that authorizes review, and whether the petitioner asserts the agency
action invades vested rights. Id. §§ 256-258.
180. See, e.g., Thornton v. Carlson, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 375, 379 (Ct. App. 1992).
181. But see California Hotel & Motel Assoc., 599 P.2d at 38-39 n.30 ("The precise
formulation of the standard may be less important than what courts actually do in exercis-
ing deferential but not perfunctory review.").
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viewing court "is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mis-
take has been committed," it may reverse. 182 Federal courts use the
"clearly erroneous" standard to review factual determinations made
by the trial judge acting without a jury under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a).183 Although the issue has room for argument, the
better position places the "clearly erroneous" standard somewhere
between de novo review and the deferential review given to jury
findings.
In a case arising under the Fourth Amendment, 8 4 the California
Supreme Court asserted the "substantial evidence" standard "for
present purposes, is equivalent to federal 'clearly erroneous' scru-
tiny.' 185 Although in California "for [Fourth Amendment] purposes"
this equivalence is now the law and it has simplified review in criminal
cases, hopefully courts will not take this assertion of equivalence out
of context and begin reviewing all factual determinations under the
"clearly erroneous" standard. Even if there is substantial evidence to
support a determination, an appellate court can nevertheless find that
determination to be "clearly erroneous" as long as the appellate court
firmly believes a mistake has been made. Using the clearly erroneous
standard in place of the substantial evidence standard would increase
appellate scrutiny on questions of fact. This shift would be contrary to
more than a century of California law and contrary to the fundamen-
tal principles that underlie limited appellate review of fact
questions.186
Although deferring to an administrative agency's interpretation
of the law may appear to be contrary to the rule that legal issues are
reviewed independently by appellate courts, the clearly erroneous rule
actually furthers the underlying goals of appellate review. The stat-
utes governing the jurisdiction, powers, and operation of an adminis-
trative agency are often complex and the result of many years of
legislative activity. It is very likely the agency would have a better
appreciation of that history than an appellate court. Moreover, the
182. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 284-85 n.14 (1982) (quoting United
States v. United States Gypsum, 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
183. FED R. Civ. P. 52(a).
184. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
185. People v. Mickey, 818 P.2d 84, 98 (Cal. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 65 (1992).
186. Notably, the "clearly erroneous" standard is used by federal appellate courts only
to review findings of fact made by the trial judge, not by the jury. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
Given the requirement that a trial judge render an opinion explicitly containing findings of
fact, id., there is reason to believe that an appellate court is in a better position to review a
trial judge's fact findings than a jury's fact findings, which are unsupported by a written
opinion.
constitutional or statutory creation of an administrative agency and
the conferral upon it of substantial quasi-legislative and quasi-adjudi-
cative powers suggests a need for courts to proceed somewhat cau-
tiously in rejecting an agency's interpretation of its own authorizing
statutes. The clearly erroneous standard properly reflects that
caution.
f. Review of Arbitration Judgments
The future of California's courts will very likely include a vastly
increased reliance upon various forms of alternative dispute resolu-
tion. This increased reliance will have substantial implications for
California's appellate courts.
The statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration award in cases
of private, or nonjudicial, arbitration are extremely narrow, including
only the following:
(a) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue
means;
(b) There was corruption in any of the arbitrators;
(c) The rights of such party were substantially prejudiced by mis-
conduct of a neutral arbitrator;
(d) The arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be
corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the con-
troversy submitted; or
(e) The rights of such party were substantially prejudiced by the
refusal of the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient
cause being shown therefor or by the refusal of the arbitrators to
hear evidence material to the controversy or by other conduct of the
arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this title.187
The grounds for correcting, rather than vacating, an arbitration award
are slightly broader, but still quite narrow:
(a) There was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident
mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referred
to in the award;
(b) The arbitrators exceeded their powers but the award may be
corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the con-
troversy submitted; or
(c) The award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the
merits of the controversy. 188
There does not appear to be great dissatisfaction with the narrow
grounds for appellate review of private arbitration awards, probably
because the parties themselves have agreed to the procedure largely
to avoid the expense and delay associated with liligation. There has
187. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1982); see also CAL. CT. R. 1615(d).
188. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.6 (West 1982).
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been some controversy about the extent to which an arbitration
panel's legal error could form the basis for challenging an arbitration
award, but the California Supreme Court's exhaustive opinion in
Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase largely puts to rest any argument that
legal errors could form the basis for setting aside an arbitration
award.18 9 As the court properly explained, "The arbitrator's resolu-
tion of [both issues of law and fact] is what the parties bargained for in
the arbitration agreement."'190 Moncharsh insures that cases diverted
from the trial courts to arbitration as a result of private arbitration
agreements will not come back to haunt the judicial system (including
the appellate courts) in the form of petitions and appellate reviews of
petitions to vacate awards.
Mandatory judicial arbitration,' 9' in contrast with private arbitra-
tion, presently gives the parties the option of securing an independent
trial in the trial court following the arbitration award.192 A party
seeking an independent trial takes a substantial risk, however, because
the statute imposes costs and fees upon a party who fails to secure
from the trial court a judgment that is "more favorable in either the
amount of damages awarded or the type of relief granted."' 93 In a
1984 study of mandatory judicial arbitration, the Judicial Council's
Mandatory Arbitration Rules Advisory Committee came to the fol-
lowing positive conclusion:
The committee finds that judicial arbitration is a valuable dispute
resolution mechanism which has favorably affected the cost, com-
plexity, and time associated with litigating smaller civil cases. The
users of the program-litigants and their attorneys-confirm that
dispositions resulting from judicial arbitration generally tend to be
more prompt, inexpensive, and predictable, and are frequently
more satisfactory to all parties.
The program has emerged as an essential calendar manage-
ment tool for the courts, permitting the disposition of civil active
cases, including those not ordered to arbitration, to occur on the
whole more quickly and economically, while providing litigants in
smaller civil cases with a desirable alternative to conventional
litigation.' 94
189. 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992).
190. Id. at 916.
191. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE §§ 1141.10, 1141.13, 1141.15 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993).
For the differences between mandatory judicial arbitration and private arbitration, see
Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 696 P.2d 645, 648-49 & n.5 (Cal. 1985).
192. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1141.20 (West Supp. 1993).
193. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1141.21(a) (West Supp. 1993).
194. 6 WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, supra note 154, § 318 (quoting THE COUN-
CIL'S MANDATORY ARBITRATION RULE ADVISORY COMMITrEE, JUDICIAL COUNCIL RE-
PORT 5 (1984)).
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There appears to be no reason to doubt the continuing accuracy of
this study or the wisdom of its recommendation that judicial arbitra-
tion be indefinitely extended. Channelling appropriate disputes
through arbitration or other methods of alternative dispute resolution
promises to reduce the workload in both California's trial level and
appellate courts. It also appears to improve the litigants' and attor-
neys' perceptions of the justice system.
(2) The Postargument Conference and Collegial Drafting of Opinions
One of the hallmarks of the appellate process is its collegial na-
ture. Having three to seven independent judges working to resolve
the same problem helps to insure that the ultimate conclusion is just.
Dispensing with conferences in selected cases does not seem to be a
great time-saver, although some courts have done so. As Professors
Carrington, Meador, and Rosenberg have noted, it may significantly
undermine many of the benefits of the multijudge appellate bench:
"The conference is an important assurance of collegiality and also re-
inforces the individual judge's sense of personal responsibility. More-
over, the conference can in some cases contribute to the quality of the
result. The group is sometimes greater than its parts; conferring may
yield synergistic results.' 95
The same can be said about the collegial process of drafting opin-
ions. Although individual justices may be identified as the author of
most opinions, each justice who signs that opinion must assume indi-
vidual responsibility for its contents.
There appears to be little support for altering the essentially col-
legial nature of the conference or opinion writing. Technological de-
velopments are perceived to be a potential threat to collegiality. In
particular, as the nation moves toward a paperless judicial system and
the information superhighway makes telepresence routine and real,
appellate judges will not need to meet face-to-face regularly. The cur-
rently existing six districts might be collapsed into one intermediate
appellate tribunal in which three-judge panels are selected from the
entire roster of intermediate appellate judges. Public, in-person oral
argument before judges and private, postargument judicial confer-
ences will be replaced by video teleconferencing-in both instances,
without meaningful diminution of personal access by justices to one
another and staff, or of collegiality. Since all appellate judges will be
195. CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 29.
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connected to one large telecommunications network, discussions will
be conducted and opinions will be shared and drafted entirely on-line.
Some argue that there will be a continued need for direct per-
sonal contact on a daily basis between appellate judges and staff, par-
ticularly chambers' staff. In this view, the informal, daily interaction
between appellate judges and staff is a critical component of appellate
decision making. Ubiquitous, high-definition, miniaturized telecom-
munication will resolve the apprehension of such arguments because
of the ease of highly personal telepresent interactions and because of
major cost and time savings.
There are, of course, existing appellate courts that are geographi-
cally dispersed. Judges on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, for
example, have chambers in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Pasadena,
San Diego, Santa Ana, Phoenix, Reno, Seattle, Woodland Hills, Port-
land, Boise, Fairbanks, and Honolulu. Oral arguments are generally
conducted in person, as is the postargument conference, but the colle-
gial process of drafting opinions may be done by judges in three dis-
tant locations.
Although technology will permit appellate judges to be geograph-
ically dispersed, a careful and refined transition will insure use of
telepresence is achieved over time without abandoning the face-to-
face collegiality that distinguishes and enhances our state appellate
process.
F. Publicly Releasing a Reasoned Opinion
Technology is also changing the way in which appellate courts
communicate their judgments and opinions to the public. Appellate
courts have traditionally communicated their opinions on paper: A
copy of the court's written opinion is sent to the parties, is made avail-
able over the counter at the clerk's office, and is sent to a publisher for
publication in permanent volumes.
Electronic bulletin boards are fast changing this picture. Califor-
nia's Judicial Council made its electronic bulletin board available to
registered users in August 1990.196 The Council's bulletin board in-
cludes published opinions from the courts of appeal and the California
Supreme Court, as well as news releases, proposed rules of court, cal-
196. See James Evans, Bulletin Boards Minus Pushpins, S.F. DAILY J., Dec. 10, 1993, at
1. Anyone interested in registering may obtain the forms from the Administrative Office
of the Courts.
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endars, tentative rulings, and other special notices. These develop-
ments begin the process of converting to a paperless appellate court.
11L. The Public Output of the Appellate Courts
The deliberations of appellate tribunals traditionally have been
hidden from public view. Direct contact with the public is limited to
oral argument, public announcement of a decision, and release of an
opinion in support of that decision. Preparation for oral argument,
the conference after oral argument, and the drafting of opinions are
private and confidential (except when clerks or judges disclose such
processes to the public, a practice that is frowned upon by most appel-
late judges).
A. Public and Media Access to Appellate Arguments
Appellate arguments are open to the public. Some cases are of
interest only to the litigants, while others raise important questions of
interest not only to lawyers, but to the entire community. It is alto-
gether appropriate that appellate courts begin planning for the day
when all appellate proceedings are available to the public through
television.
The benefits of televising appellate arguments are manifold. The
public benefits by having access to an important governmental activ-
ity. There are significant educational opportunities for students at all
levels. The news media will provide better access to the public and
enhance its own commentary and editorial resources. Attorneys not
directly involved, but who have an interest in monitoring specific
cases, will no longer need to travel to the appellate courthouse.
In the 1970s, there was a fear that televising judicial proceedings
might interfere with the nature of those proceedings, 9 7 and some ap-
pellate justices still express that fear. Yet experience with the media
in the trial courtroom, controlled by the judge,'198 indicates litigants
and attorneys tend to behave as though the cameras are not present.
The California Supreme Court has been willing to experiment with
televising its own oral arguments. The first delayed broadcast of a
supreme court oral argument occurred in 1981 in People v. Shirley.199
The first live broadcast occurred in the 1991 oral arguments in Legisla-
197. Randall Kelso & Sonia M. Pawluc, Focus on Cameras in the Courtroom: The Flor-
ida Experience, the California Experiment, and the Pending Decision in Chandler v. Florida,
12 PAc. L.J. 1, 7-9 (1980).
198. CAL. CT. R. 980.
199. 723 P.2d 1354 (Cal.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1125, 459 U.S. 860 (1982).
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ture of the State of California v. Eu.20 0 The court of appeal should
begin experimenting with televising oral arguments in selected cases,
perhaps coordinating the broadcast with local law schools.
Many oral arguments in the court of appeal would be of interest
only to the litigants and the court, and the audience for such argu-
ments presumably would be relatively small. However, there will be
exceptions; some key cases of real significance are dealt with conclu-
sively in the intermediate appellate courts.20' Supreme court argu-
ments, by contrast, are much more likely to command wide public
attention. The supreme court should study the possibility of broad-
casting all its oral arguments.
B. Publication or Depublcation of Opinions
Without doubt, the reasoned opinions drafted in support of ap-
pellate decisions represent the most significant access the public has to
the work of appellate tribunals. Public release of a written opinion
supporting an appellate decision advances all of the core appellate
goals. First, the process of researching and analyzing a case, followed
by writing an opinion joined by two of three (or four of seven) justices
helps to insure the appellate court's initial decision withstands the dis-
ciplined rigor of a written memorialization. One thoughtful appellate
judge has described the process as follows:
A remarkably effective device for detecting fissures in accuracy and
logic is the reduction to writing of the results of one's thought
processes. The custom of American courts of embodying decision
in a written opinion setting forth facts, law, logic, and policy is not
the least of their strengths. Somehow, a decision mulled over in
one's head or talked about in conference looks different when
dressed up in written words and sent out into the sunlight. Some-
times the passage of time or a new way of looking at the issue
makes us realize that an opinion will simply not do, and back we go
to the drawing board. Or we may be in the very middle of an opin-
ion, struggling to reflect the reasoning all judges have agreed on,
only to realize that it simply "won't write." The act of writing tells
us what was wrong with the act of thinking.20 2
There is of course a distinction between requiring that all appel-
late decisions be supported by a written opinion and requiring that all
written opinions be published. Arguably, the error correction goal
could be adequately served by the writing requirement without impos-
ing a publication requirement. At the same time, however, a court,
200. 816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1292 (1992).
201. See, e.g., State Bd. of Educ. v. Honig, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727 (Ct. App. 1993).
202. CoFmN, supra note 4, at 57.
aware its written opinion will be published and could influence deci-
sions in future cases, is more likely to spend more effort insuring the
opinion fully and clearly supports the conclusion. Requiring all deci-
sions to be supported by a written opinion and to be published would
best advance the error correction goal.
Second, publication of a written opinion appears to be the only
practical way of insuring a uniform declaration of the law. Absent
publication of an appellate tribunal's decisions, the media, the public,
the bar, and the bench may be left guessing at the rationale for a par-
ticular decision. Publication of written opinions thus appears to be
helpful in securing uniformity in the law.
Third, publication of written opinions reinforces the public's re-
spect for and understanding of the judiciary. It gives litigants and the
public the ability to assess for themselves whether the decision
reached by the appellate court is grounded in the facts of the case and
the law applicable to those facts.
(1) The Nonpublication Problem
Although publication of written opinions clearly advances all of
the core goals of an appellate system, the California Courts of Appeal
now routinely dispense with publication of written opinions.20 3
Although a written statement of reasons in support of an appellate
decision is constitutionally required, 20 4 publication is not required. 20 5
In fiscal year 1991 to 1992, around ninety percent of the written opin-
ions issued by the court of appeal were unpublished,20 6 and thus avail-
able only sporadically to the public and not citable as precedent in
subsequent cases. The figure is up from eighty-five percent just six
years ago.20 7 Unpublished opinions are of use and guidance only to
the parties and the California Supreme Court as it decides whether to
grant review.
The standards for publication are contained in the California
Rules of Court as follows:
No opinion of a court of appeal or an appellate department of the
superior court may be published in the Official Reports unless the
opinion:
(1) establishes a new rule of law, applies an existing rule to a
set of facts significantly different from those stated in published
203. See CAL. CT. R. 976(a)-(b).
204. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14.
205. See CAL. CT. R. 976(b).
206. 1 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 31.
207. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1985 ANNUAL REPORT 101 (1986).
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opinions, or modifies, or criticizes with reasons given, an existing
rule;
(2) resolves or creates an apparent conflict in the law;
(3) involves a legal issue of continuing public interest; or
(4) makes a significant contribution to legal literature by re-
viewing either the development of a common law rule or the legisla-
tive or judicial history of a provision of a constitution, statute, or
other written law.208
To publish an opinion, a majority of the panel deciding the appeal
must agree that the opinion meets one or more of these criteria.2 09
The court of appeal's decision to publish or not to publish is review-
able by the supreme court upon proper application.210
The consequences of not publishing an opinion are significant.
"An opinion that is not ordered published shall not be cited or relied
on by a court or a party in any other action or proceeding except as
provided in subdivision (b)."121' Narrow exceptions are created for ap-
plication of "the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral
estoppel" and for use in "a criminal or disciplinary action or proceed-
ing because it states reasons for a decision affecting the same defend-
ant or respondent in another such action or proceeding. '212
The substantive standards contained in California Rule of Court
976 and the no-citation rule contained in California Rule of Court 977
are premised on the belief that the error correction goal of appellate
review is primarily of interest only to the parties and not the public
and that the error correction goal is not advanced by routine publica-
tion of opinions. The publication standards are more closely linked to
the second goal of appellate review-promoting a uniform declaration
of the law. Starting from that premise, the substantive standards in
California Rule of Court 976 trigger publication only if the opinion
makes a change in the law, creates a conflict in the law, involves an
important legal issue, or contributes to the development of the law.
The no-citation rule is designed to insure that an unpublished opinion
has no effect on the development of the law in subsequent cases.
There are good reasons to believe that the premises underlying
the non-publication rule-namely, that error correction is of interest
only to the parties and publication does nothing to advance that inter-
208. CAL. CT. R. 976(b).
209. CAL. CT. R. 976(c).
210. CAL. CT. R. 978, 979.
211. CAL. CT. R. 977(a). For a discussion of some of the reasons why the noncitation
rule was adopted, see Robert A. Seligson & John S. Warnloff, The Use of Unreported Cases
in California, 24 HASTiNGS Li. 37 (1972).
212. CAL. CT. R. 977(b).
est-are wrong. First, as noted above, there is some reason to believe
that a tribunal will be more careful in its approach to a case if it knows
that its final work product, a written opinion, will be disseminated to
the public. Second, Professors Carrington, Meador, and Rosenberg
correctly observe that
non-publication inevitably reduces the visibility of the correcting
function of the appeal. Over time, it must depreciate that basic
function, leaving trial courts and administrative agencies more on
their own, and increasing general anxiety about the integrity of the
legal process at all levels. Visibility is too important to too many of
our imperatives to be abandoned in favor of the limited benefits of
non-publication. 213
Third, even if the error-correcting function in a particular case is of
primary interest only to the parties, the public surely has an interest in
how well error correction is working in the great mass of cases. The
nonpublication rule discourages interested members of the public
from even attempting to study error correction. It creates a great risk
that errors are simply being swept under the rug. Indeed, when the
nonpublication rule is combined with the harmless error doctrine, it is
possible for the court of appeal to sweep trial court errors under two
layers of rugs: first, the error is declared harmless, and second, the
error is not published. The public has an interest in how well error
correction is working, and publication of opinions advances that goal.
Routine nonpublication of opinions also undermines the second
goal of appellate review-promoting a uniform declaration of the law.
California Rule of Court 976 attempts to protect this goal by requiring
publication of opinions that may have an influence on the law. In
both theory and practice, however, Rule 976 fails. As a matter of ju-
risprudential theory, it is simply impossible for the court that writes an
opinion to know with certainty whether that opinion or decision
changes the law. The meaning of a judicial opinion is in the eye of the
beholder, not in the mind of the author. Opinions have the meaning
that is attributed to them by subsequent courts.
This is more than just a matter of mere theory. Scholars have
documented instances when multipanel appellate courts appear to dis-
agree internally in their application of law to recurring fact pat-
terns. 214 Yet by virtue of the no-citation rule, counsel is unable even
to bring the state of disarray to the appellate courts' attention.
213. CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 39.
214. Id. at 38; James N. Gardner, Ninth Circuit's Unpublished Opinions: Denial of
Equal Justice?, 61 A.B.A. J. 1224 (1975).
[Vol. 45HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
March 1994] REPORT ON THE CALIFORNIA APPELLATE SYSTEM 491
Routine nonpublication also creates an unlevel playing field that
may undermine the public's confidence in the fairness of appellate
processes. Although unpublished opinions are not widely available to
the public, they are in fact publicly released by the court and are
therefore available to anyone with the resources to collect them. In
particular, as Professors Carrington, Meador, and Rosenberg have
noted, "Access is limited to lawyers who can conveniently get to the
court's files and to the governmental and institutional law offices that
are in position to maintain their own collections of clandestine opin-
ions. '215 Dean Uelmen reported in a 1990 article that "[s]ome major
law firms and public offices have a standing order for copies of all
unpublished opinions. '216
Finally, routine nonpublication diminishes the importance of the
court of appeal in our constitutional structure. Why is California dedi-
cating such significant resources (three judges per case, associated
staff, building space, and so on) to resolve appeals when nine out of
every ten appellate decisions are of practical interest and utility only
to the litigants? California either should make the court of appeal's
work product publicly available to all for review, or should redirect
significant numbers of cases away from that court (perhaps towards
the appellate department of the superior court).
The pressure to publish only selected opinions (or selected por-
tions of opinions) appears to have been largely economic. As the
number of appeals increased, the sheer volume of published opinions
began to overwhelm the shelf space capacity of our libraries and the
research capacity of lawyers trying to differentiate the wheat from the
chaff.217 Technology ultimately may provide a solution to the shelf
space problem. As California moves in the direction of a paperless
court, we can visualize the day when all appellate opinions would be
readily available to all members of the public through electronic pub-
lishing services operated by the state and private publishers.
As for the problem of separating important from unimportant
opinions, courts could still publish two types of opinions, a full-blown
opinion in appropriate cases and a memorandum opinion in all other
cases (that would, in all significant respects, look like an unpublished
215. CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 36.
216. Gerald F. Uelmen, Depublication, L.A. LAW., Aug.-Sept. 1990, at 49, 51.
217. CARRINGTON ET AL, supra note 7, at 35; Jack Leavitt, The Yearly Two Foot Shelf-
Suggestions for Changing Our Reviewing Court Procedure, 4 PAC. L.J. 1, 3 (1973).
opinion).218 The simple act of labeling an opinion as a "memorandum
opinion" would be a signal to the bar that the court does not view the
opinion as having much precedential value.
Notwithstanding these arguments, the almost uniform reaction of
appellate judges and practicing lawyers has been that the nonpublica-
tion and noncitation rules are critically important to the court of ap-
peal in preparing and processing its cases and to the practicing bar in
litigating appeals. Pride of authorship and concerns that a published
opinion may be cited as precedent result in court of appeal judges
spending proportionally more time editing and crafting published
opinions than unpublished opinions. Thus, judges likely would spend
more time on a published memorandum opinion than on an unpub-
lished memorandum opinion even though the ultimate work product
might be just as short as an unpublished opinion. With approximately
9,000 unpublished opinions per year, requiring court of appeal justices
to spend even slightly more time per opinion would have a significant
impact upon their ability to keep up with the court's caseload.
Moreover, both bench and bar agree the overwhelming majority
of unpublished opinions are actually useless for future litigation be-
cause they involve no new law and no new, applicable factual situa-
tions. Yet if these opinions were published and citable, lawyers would
have to search them to confirm that nothing useful was in them,
thereby increasing the cost of legal research.
There is a compromise position between publication of all opin-
ions and nonpublication of nearly all opinions that might satisfy pro-
ponents on both sides of this issue: Make all unpublished opinions
available electronically (which would give the public, scholars and the
court of appeal easy access) but retain the no-citation rule (which
would address the practical concerns expressed by appellate lawyers
and judges). As appellate courts become paperless, provision should
be made for giving the public access to unpublished as well as pub-
lished opinions.
(2) The Depublication Problem
The practice of not publishing certain court of appeal opinions
sets the stage for an additional problem: the California Supreme
218. CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 39-41. The authors suggest that memoran-
dum opinions should be published "in a different fashion and in a separate set of books
from the reports that contain the full opinions." Id. at 40. Witkin provides useful chapters
on how to write a good (and short) memorandum opinion. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPEL-
LATE COURT OPINIONS, supra note 36, chs. IX-X.
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Court's related power to depublish court of appeal opinions. If the
supreme court were to restrict its depublication orders to those in-
stances in which a published court of appeal decision did not meet the
criteria contained in California Rule of Court 976, few would be heard
to complain. However, for many years the supreme court has used its
depublication power as a way of shaping the development of Califor-
nia law. More particularly, depublication often occurs "because a ma-
jority of the justices consider the opinion to be wrong in some
significant way, such that it would mislead the bench and bar if it re-
mained as citable precedent.1219
The depublication practice has long been criticized. Some critics,
including some court of appeal judges, liken depublication to a form
of censorship and complain that depublication results in the consign-
ment of some of the best work of court of appeal judges to a sort of
purgatory.220 However, as Kent Richland has noted, an opinion that
is depublished is not censored; the opinion remains published in the
unofficial reporter and is available electronically.221 The only effect a
depublication order has is to deprive the lower court decision of any
precedential effect. 222 Even more to the point, a court of appeal opin-
ion is not the property of any single justice or the panel of three jus-
tices who heard the appeal. The opinion is the opinion of the court,
and the California Supreme Court, as the highest court in the state,
undoubtedly has the responsibility, as well as the power, to control the
output of lower courts.
Some complain the process is essentially unfair to appellants be-
cause, having decided something in the court of appeal's opinion was
wrong enough to justify depublication, the supreme court nevertheless
denied review of the decision. This criticism simply misses the point
of depublication; depublication does not mean the decision was
wrong, but usually only that something in the opinion was wrong even
though the decision was correct.22 3 There is thus no unfairness or il-
logic in depublishing an opinion while leaving the decision intact.
219. Joseph R. Grodin, The Depublication Practice of the California Supreme Court, 72
CAL. L. REv. 514, 514-15 (1984).
220. See, e.g., Robert Gerstein, Law By Elimination: Depublication in the California
Supreme Court, 67 JUDIcATUR 293, 298 (1984); Philip Carrizosa, Making the Law Disap-
pear, CAL. LAW., Sept. 1989, at 65-66; Lisa Stansky, Depublication: Law Made By Eraser,
THE RECORDER, Jan. 9, 1990, at 2-3; Gerald F. Uelmen, Mainstream Justice: A Review of
the Second Year of the Lucas Court, CAL. LAW., July 1989, at 37, 40.
221. Kent L. Richland, Depublication, 13 L.A. LAw., Aug.-Sept. 1990, at 48, 50.
222. CAL. CT. R. 977(a).
223. Grodin, supra note 219, at 522.
A more substantial objection to depublication is that such orders
leave the bench and bar guessing about the law. Yet the California
Supreme Court's primary responsibility is to rationally guide the de-
velopment of the law by its decisions, not to decide all of the open
questions of law at the earliest opportunity. As Justice Grodin noted,
requiring the supreme court to draft a statement of reasons for depub-
lication would substantially undermine the administrative conven-
ience presently associated with the depublication process, and the
precedential value of such a statement of reasons would be open to
question.22 4
Not all of the criticisms are so easily answered, however. The
best reason in support of depublication is that it gives the court the
ability to eradicate the court of appeal's erroneous statements of the
law without requiring the supreme court to expend its full resources in
plenary review of a case that otherwise is not deserving of full review.
It is, in short, an efficient way of keeping the law clean.2 25
There are several errors in this analysis. First, the depublication
process consumes a substantial amount of the court's resources be-
cause it diverts the court's attention away from its more important
responsibility of declaring what is the law (rather than implicitly indi-
cating by depublication what is not the law). In order to decide
whether an opinion should be depublished, the court must engage
enough of its attention to determine that something in the opinion is
wrong, and presumably, the court spends more time thinking about a
depublication than it does a denial of a petition for review. This raises
a question of whether the incremental savings from the depublication
process compared to plenary review (especially when the court can
limit review to one or more issues) is worth the discomfort created by
the depublication process.
Second, the analysis assumes the supreme court can correctly de-
termine whether the court of appeal did something wrong short of full
briefing, oral argument, and preparation of a draft opinion. A peti-
tion for review is no substitute for full briefing. And even if oral argu-
ment is dispensable (a dubious proposition in the context of cases
important enough to attract the supreme court's attention), the re-
224. Id. at 524-25.
225. But see Arcadia Unified Sch. Dist. v. State Dep't of Educ., 825 P.2d 438 (Cal.
1992), in which depublication of a prior court of appeal decision involving the California
Department of Education resulted in confusion as to the constitutionality of California
Education Code § 39807.5 and required the court to expand the "public policy" exception
to rules of finality.
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quirement of an opinion with attendant reasoning is designed not only
for the benefit of the parties and the public, but to insure the court
itself has fully analyzed the issues involved in the case. Every time the
court takes the shortcut of ordering depublication, it risks falling into
error.
Third, the depublication practice would appear to violate the
spirit, if not the letter, of the constitutional requirement that all deci-
sions that determine causes by California Appellate Courts be sup-
ported by an opinion with reasons.226 It is plain that an order of
depublication-unlike a mere denial of review-changes the state of
the law. At the very least, an opinion that was part of California law is
expurgated, and the law has thereby been changed.227 The written-
opinion-with-reasons clause of the California Constitution expresses
the long tradition that significant judicial decisions and judicially
caused changes in the law be supported by publicly available reason-
ing.228 Indeed, the reasoned opinion is intended to distinguish the ju-
dicial branch from the other branches of government.
Finally, even the defenders of the depublication practice have
recognized that there is a danger of abuse. Kent Richland, who other-
wise supports depublication, issued the following caveat:
226. The California Constitution provides that "[d]ecisions of the Supreme Court and
courts of appeal that determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated." CAL.
CONST. art. VI, § 14. Professor Stephen R. Barnett fleshes out this provision and also
contends that depublication orders are an unconstitutional exercise of non-judicial power.
Barnett, supra note 80. His article is accompanied by a number of other articles devoted to
depublication, including Dean Uelmen's most recent attack on the practice. Gerald F.
Uelmen, Publication and Depublication of California Court of Appeal Opinions: Is the
Eraser Mightier than the Pencil?, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1007 (1993).
227. As a practical matter, an order of depublication is also treated by the bar as hav-
ing more precedential significance than a mere denial of review, Barnett, supra note 80, at
1050-52, an entirely reasonable treatment in light of the fact that depublication apparently
reflects the supreme court's judgment that something in the opinion was wrong.
California Rule of Court 979(e) now provides that "[a]n order of the Supreme Court
directing depublication of an opinion in the Official Reports shall not be deemed an ex-
pression of opinion of the Supreme Court of the correctness of the result reached by the
decision or of any of the law set forth in the opinion." CAL. CT. R. 979(e). This rule simply
is not credible. The only sensible rationale for taking the time to depublish is because
something was wrong with the opinion. Rule 979(e) simply reinforces all of the objections
to the depublication practice.
228. Technically, article VI, § 14 applies only to decisions in "causes," CAL. CONST. art.
VI, § 14, which has generally been interpreted as applying only to decisions on the merits.
9 WrrKiN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, supra note 154, § 554. In a depublication case, the
court denies the petition for review, so the decision would appear not to be a "cause." On
the other hand, the court arguably must have exercised enough jurisdiction to depublish
the offending opinion, and if it exercised such jurisdiction, why is, a depublication decision
not a decision of a "cause"?
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But like any other useful tool, depublication can be misused.
California needs a supreme court that issues opinions on the signifi-
cant legal questions of the day. Depublication provides no substi-
tute for that function. If, as some have suggested, the supreme
court is responding to its current workload crisis by depublishing
opinions where it should grant review, the answer is not to abolish
depublication, which plainly has a legitimate role to play. The an-
swer, rather, is to institute whatever reforms are necessary to insure
that the supreme court can perform its fundamental job-to provide
guidance to our legal system on important issues-in optimum
fashion.22 9
The sheer number of opinions depublished causes concern about
whether the court has not crossed the line from a proper use of depub-
lication to its misuse. Dean Uelmen reports that the California
Supreme Court, during the six years under Chief Justice Lucas, pub-
lished 650 opinions and depublished 695 opinions. 230 From sheer vol-
ume, the incidence of depublication strongly suggests it is an abused,
overused tool.
California appears to be the only jurisdiction in the country to
permit its highest court to control the development of the law by
depublishing court of appeal opinions. It is a practice that should be
stopped.
IV. Relationships Between the Appellate System and Other
Entities
The appellate system shares interests and goals with several other
governmental and court entities. The appellate courts should reach
out to encourage collaboration with these entities when collaboration
will benefit the entire judicial system.
A. Relationship to the Legislative and Executive Branches
The appellate judiciary has an important interest in coordinating
its activities with the legislative and executive branches of state gov-
ernment. All three branches have a common interest in providing the
highest quality of justice on an equal basis, with sensitivity to the legit-
imate concerns and needs of a pluralistic society. The appellate judici-
ary must continue to work cooperatively with the other branches to
encourage the enactment of legislation that advances this general in-
terest as well as the narrower interests of the appellate system. Many
of the changes suggested in this Article require rule, statutory, or even
229. Richland, supra note 221, at 53.
230. Gerald F. Uelmen, Waiting for Thunderclaps, CAL. LAW., June 1993, at 29.
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constitutional changes, and those changes will not take place without
the active cooperation and support of the coordinate branches.
Appropriations, one aspect of the relationship between appellate
courts and the other branches, deserves special mention. The Califor-
nia Constitution does not grant the judicial branch express authority
to appropriate funds necessary for its operation. While by statute, su-
perior and municipal courts are expressly given the power to appoint
county officers to authorize expenditures necessary for the operation
of those courts in the event the local governmental units fail to appro-
priate sufficient resources, 231 no similar express power has been
vested in the California Supreme Court or California Courts of Ap-
peal. Thus, if these courts have any power to order appropriations for
the benefit of the judiciary, such a power must be derived as a neces-
sary adjunct to the grant of judicial power to the judicial branch of the
state.
There is some reason to believe that the judicial power may en-
compass the power to order expenditures when constitutional princi-
ples will necessarily be sacrificed in absence of those expenditures or
appropriations3 32 Indeed, for constitutional remedies, courts may
have the power to impose taxes on the people and raise revenue if
new revenues can be shown absolutely necessary to achieve constitu-
tional compliance3 33 The budget crisis in New York through 1991 and
1992 triggered a lawsuit by members of the judicial branch against the
executive branch on these very grounds. 3 4
Although the appellate courts may have residual power to order
appropriations when absolutely necessary to preserve the core func-
tions of the judicial branch, painful budget cuts can occur long before
the constitutional line has been crossed. It is therefore very much in
231. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 68073 (West Supp. 1993).
232. In Mandel v. Myers, 629 P.2d 935, 940 (Cal. 1981), the California Supreme Court
very carefully avoided holding that it lacked power to order appropriations in all circum-
stances. Rather, the court noted only that the decisions in State Bd. of Educ. v. Levit, 343
P.2d 8 (Cal. 1959), and United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), "clearly demonstrate
that while the separation of powers doctrine may restrict a court from directly ordering the
Legislature to enact an appropriation law, the doctrine does not preclude the judiciary
from decreeing that funds that have been appropriated by the Legislature should be paid
without regard to an improper or invalid legislative restriction." Mandel, 629 P.2d at 941
(emphasis added). The clear implication is that although Levit and Lovett "may" restrict
the judiciary's power to order an appropriation, the court is leaving that issue open for
further consideration.
233. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 55-58 (1990).
234. See Judge Wachtler Files His Suit To Get Courts More Money, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 1991, at B3.
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the appellate judiciary's interest to cooperate with the legislature and
governor to reach a shared understanding and consensus about the
budget needs of the appellate system.
One particular aspect of the appellate budget stands out as some-
thing of an anomaly. The proposed budget for 1993 to 1994 for the
appellate system-which includes the California Supreme Court, the
Courts of Appeal, the Judicial Council, and the Commission on Judi-
cial Performance-is $155.6 million, only 0.3 percent of the state's to-
tal budget. But $45 million of that budget (twenty-nine percent) is
used to compensate constitutionally required appellate defense
counsel.
This constitutionally mandated $45 million expense should not be
included in the judiciary's budget because the judiciary is constitution-
ally obligated to spend this money. The practical, political result of
inclusion is that when the Governor calls for a fifteen percent reduc-
tion in the appellate judiciary's budget, that fifteen percent (which
equals $23 million of the $155.6 figure) must be cut from what remains
after deducting the $45 million expense from the $155.6 million
budget. In other words, a so-called fifteen percent reduction in the
appellate judiciary's budget is actually a twenty-one percent cut in
funds used to operate the judiciary. Although experienced legislators
undoubtedly understand this financial reality, some legislators and the
public are unaware that a fifteen percent cut in the appellate judici-
ary's budget cuts much deeper than the fifteen percent figure would
otherwise indicate.
B. Relationship to Trial Courts
At present, a substantial gulf exists between the trial courts and
our appellate tribunals. Communication between the two systems oc-
curs primarily in the form of opinions by the court of appeal reviewing
the work of the trial courts in individual cases. Trial court judges are
represented in the Judicial Council and upon the Council's many com-
mittees, although trial judges do not make up a majority of the Coun-
cil's voting members,235 a point of contention among some trial
judges. But when it comes to the core goals of the appellate system,
the written opinion in the individual case remains the primary mode
of communication.
There is sonfe reason to believe that additional channels of com-
munication should be opened (e.g., by creating an Appellate and Trial
235. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6. Trial-level judges fill 10 out of the Council's 21 seats.
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Courts Coordinating Council) and that a significant amount of error
reduction (not just error correction) and improvements in coordina-
tion could be accomplished through these alternate channels.3 6 For
instance, around ninety percent of the criminal cases filed in Califor-
nia are pled prior to trial, and a significant portion of the court of
appeal's criminal docket consists of appeals following guilty pleas. For
example, around forty-four percent of the Third Appellate District's
criminal docket are appeals following guilty pleas, and many of those
are Wende appeals.237 Correctly accepting a guilty plea is a more in-
volved process than the public (or even most lawyers) imagine, and
perfecting an appeal from a plea is an equally challenging adventure.
Both of these processes are, however, amenable to standardized treat-
ments through the use of forms, scripts, and rules, and there is no
reason why such standardized processes should not be contemplated
by the appellate courts in consultation with members of the trial
bench. Justice Nicholson of the Third Appellate District, in the first
paper prepared as part of a study of the "Trial Court Plea/Disposition
Continuum,"'' 8 includes analysis and a series of forms for superior
courts to use after sentencing in criminal cases disposed of by plea as
guidance through the process of perfecting an appeal under California
Penal Code Section 1237.5 and preparing the trial court record on
appeal.239
236. An Appellate and Trial Courts Coordinating Council could consist of thirteen
members: two representatives each from the six Administrative Presiding Judges and
clerk-administrators of the Court of Appeal; two representatives each from the Appellate,
Trial Court Presiding Judges, Trial Court clerk-administrators, and Rules and Forms com-
mittees of the Judicial Council; and a representative from the Center for Judicial Education
and Research. See infra Figure 2. In addition to the typical staffing for such an entity, the
Coordinating Council should be associated with a law school and university to insure that a
rich mix of criticism, research, and new ideas are always part of its evolving agenda. The
Coordinating Council would have as its primary charge developing and implementing pro-
cedures to reduce trial court error.
237. Telephone Interview with Third Appellate District Clerk of Court (Dec. 14, 1993)
(based on 1991 internal study).
238. See infra Figure 3.
239. The Trial Court Plea-Disposition Continuum would be an ongoing consideration
for the Appellate and Trial Courts Coordinating Council.
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The Appellate and Trials Courts Coordinating Council
would consist of twelve members: two representatives
each from the six Administrative Presiding Justices and
Clerk/Administrators of the Court of Appeal, and two
representatives each from the Appellate, Trial Court
Presiding Judges, Trial Court Clerk/ Administrators,
and Rules and Forms committees of the Judicial
Council. The Council would be a permanent adjunct to
the work of these various elements and of the Judicial
Council. In addition to the typical staffing for such an
entity, it would be associated with a law school and
university to insure a rich mix of criticism, research and
new ideas are part of its evolving agendas.
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There are undoubtedly many other routine trial court functions
that, if improperly performed, generate extra work for the appellate
system, and many of these routine functions are susceptible to a simi-
lar sort of standardized treatment. One could imagine, for example,
the adoption of a standardized presentence report. Perhaps sentenc-
ing errors, which form a substantial portion of criminal appeals, could
be reduced by uniformly developing or adopting existing computer
programs to assist the trial judge in arriving at a sentence.
This sort of a systemic approach to reducing errors in the trial
courts can be viewed as another alternative form of appellate review.
Instead of reviewing individual errors, the appellate courts, working
with the trial courts, should seek to identify repetitive, avoidable er-
rors and to develop mechanisms by which those errors can be avoided.
It is very much in the appellate courts' interest, after all, to reduce
trial court errors, rather than simply correct them after they have
occurred.
Many, and perhaps most, of these efforts could be readily accom-
plished through the California Center for Judicial Education and Re-
search (CJER). Formed in 1973, the CIER, which is funded by the
The Trial Court Plea/Disposition Continuum would be an on-going consideration for the
Appellate and Trial Courts Coordinating Council. The Council would be responsible for devel-
oping work plans, lists of anticipated goals and work products, and schedules of deadlines for a
range of subjects of mutual interest to the appellate and trial courts. In this instance, the Council
would do so for the Continuum. Working groups would be organized and put in place, admin-
istrative plans congealed, and, as necessary, needed statutory and rule changes, and other work
products, would be in draft form for the Continuum by December 1993. One Court of Appeal
district and one of its trial court components would be involved with the Council and the
Continuum.
The Trial Court Plea/Disposition Continuum
Plea Plea Presentation Presentence Sentence Perfection I Record
Negotiation Investigation Report of Preparation
IAppeal
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Judicial Council, is responsible for educational programs for judges
and other judicial officers. In addition to providing training for new
trial and appellate judges, the CJER has continuing educational pro-
grams for judges and regularly published written materials to keep
California's judiciary current, such as judges' benchbooks. With the
creation of a state-wide judicial computer network, the CJER will be
able to digest and transmit timely information to trial courts regarding
trial court errors as identified by the appellate courts. The CJER
should become an important conduit between the appellate courts and
the trial courts.240
C. Relationship to Federal Courts
California's appellate courts have a special interest in forming
links with the federal courts that have jurisdiction in California. The
most significant reason for such a link is to facilitate the coordination
of state criminal cases that ultimately may be habeas cases in federal
court. Although the United States Supreme Court has significantly
streamlined the habeas process in recent years, 241 California appellate
courts would benefit by opening a dialogue with the federal bench
regarding the reduction of constitutional errors in California's courts.
Such errors form the basis for federal habeas challenges and Califor-
nia courts could help streamline federal courts' habeas petitions pro-
cess through error reduction.242 Such efforts promise increased speed
in processing habeas review, a decreased likelihood of state court er-
ror, and a resulting strengthening in the public's confidence in the
judiciary.
D. Relationship to Foreign Courts and Sovereigns
To meet its constitutional responsibility, California's appellate
courts need to use creativity, wisdom, and judgment. As the largest
240. The same digests and educational materials should be made available to other
interested agencies within the government, and perhaps to the public as well. For example,
local police departments and other governmental investigatory agencies have a great need
to know about developments in criminal law, particularly regarding search and seizure
rules, to be able to adjust policy and practice accordingly. There is no reason in principle
why the CJER should not assume a much more central role in educating not only judges,
but other government officials as well, about developments in the law.
241. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on
Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1997 (1992); Kathleen Patchel,
The New Habeas, 42 HASTINGs L.J. 939 (1991); Herbert Wechsler, Habeas Corpus and the
Supreme Court: Reconsidering the Reach of the Great Writ, 59 COLO. L. REv. 167 (1988).
242. See, e.g., Victoria Slind-Flor, 9th Circuit's Theme: Federalism, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 30,
1993, at 32 (reporting on Ninth Circuit's annual meeting).
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state judicial system in the country, some of California's problems are
unique. But many of California's problems are similar to problems in
other states, in the federal system, and in other countries, including
this nation's immediate neighbors, Canada and Mexico. California's
courts should draw upon the experiences and expertise of other sys-
tems to modify their own and to be able to cooperate with other sys-
tems if necessary. Through a process of comparison, critical self-
reflection, and thoughtful growth, California's courts will be able to
assure California's citizens that their judicial system is worthy of re-
spect and pride and able to deal effectively with other systems.
Cooperation with the Canadian and Mexican bench and bar is
especially important in light of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), which will go into effect on January 1, 1994.243
NAFTA creates a free trade area and provides for the gradual re-
moval of tariff and nontariff trade barriers in goods and services be-
tween the three signatories, the United States, Canada, and Mexico.
Unlike the Treaty of Rome2 44 and the Maastricht Treaty,245 both of
which establish the supranational authority of institutions comprising
the European Economic Community (EEC), NAFTA does not create
formal dispute-resolution institutions that are empowered to issue
binding judgments or enact binding laws. But NAFTA does, in advi-
sory language, call for the harmonization of laws affecting trade, and
there is a good possibility that more formal supranational institutions
will ultimately be created as problems of implementation under
NAFTA arise.246
History demonstrates that sovereigns constantly strive to expand
their spheres of influence and control beyond their existing territorial
boundaries, in part simply to satisfy the sometimes insatiable desire
for more power and in part to create governmental structures that can
legitimately regulate expanding private institutions (e.g., the interna-
tional conglomerate). Throughout most of history, expansion was ac-
complished through the use of force. In recent years, expansion has
243. NAFTA Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
244. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 1988 G.
Brit. T.S. No. 49 (Cmd. 455) 82 (original version at 298 U.N.T.S. 11).
245. Belgium-Denmark-France-Federal Republic of Germany-Greece-Ireland-Italy-
Luxembourg-Netherlands-Portugal-Spain-United Kingdom Treaty on European Union
and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992).
246. See generally Frederick M. Abbott, Integration Without Institutions: The NAFTA
Mutation of the EC Model and the Future of the GATT Regime, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 917
(1992) (arguing that NAFTA may evolve toward the current European Community struc-
ture as implementation problems arise).
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often taken the form of intergovernmental alliances in which elements
of sovereignty are either bargained away to a larger governmental
structure, as in the case of the EEC, or made subject to superior inter-
national obligations, as in the case of the United Nations. While no
one today would forecast the creation by 2020 of a unified North
American (or hemispheric) state along the lines of the EEC, increase
in transnational cooperation between Canada, Mexico, and the
United States is likely, and such cooperation may have effects on the
United States' judicial system. As the nation's largest judicial system
and in light of California's proximity to Mexico, California will likely
become a ground for judicial experimentation. The California appel-
late courts should at minimum be aware of this position and be willing
to take an active role.
E. Relationship to the Court Library
The court library is an integral part of the appellate system. It is
the court's access to all materials, besides the record and briefs, that
are necessary to resolve appeals. Because of its importance to the
decision-making process, appellate courts must insure that court li-
braries remain adequately funded and staffed. In recent years, these
issues have been extensively studied by the State, Court, and County
Law Libraries Section of the Appellate Court Library Standards Com-
mittee, which is in turn part of the American Association of Law
Libraries. 47
While the library of the future will be changed fundamentally by
technology, it will not disappear, as noted by Harry Martin, law libra-
rian at Harvard Law School:
Will the personal computer and the growth of electronic infor-
mation threaten the very existence of the library? If everyone can
access the library catalog, computer-assisted instruction, full-text
databases, and electronic bulletin boards from their office or dorm
room, will the library atrophy? I think not. The library serves as
the interface between its community and the universe of informa-
tion. Its role is changing from being a mere custodian of books and
printed material to a multimedia information outlet, providing in-
formation, knowledge, and experience in other forms and media....
Proactive libraries committed to the new technologies are learning
centers with huge potential for enabling individuals and groups to
247. David G. Badertscher, Appellate Court Library Standards-An Overview, STATE
CT. J., Winter 1989, at 33.
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control the direction and set the pace of their ,own intellectual
growth.2 48
The new technology will allow all court libraries to be linked to-
gether in one network, creating a unified state court law library (per-
haps centered in the existing state law library in Sacramento), which
will, in turn, be linked to a national law library, probably operated out
of the Library of Congress.249 These communication links will dra-
matically improve judicial access to the universe of information rele-
vant to deciding appeals.
Especially in light of the fundamental changes to our libraries
from new technology, the Judicial Council should create a Law Li-
brary Coordinating Council including representatives of existing state
and local libraries, the State Law Librarian, and judges of all levels
with a judge designated by the Chief Justice as chair of the committee.
Intelligent planning for libraries of the future requires the centralized
oversight and planning that the Council would provide.
F. Relationship to the Center for Judicial Education and Research
The Center for Judicial Education and Research will continue to
play the leadership role in preparing new and sitting trial and appel-
late judges for the twenty-first centuryo50  New technologies will
make it possible for the CJER to organize and conduct its courses
more efficiently.251 Those courses and the written materials pertinent
to them will be paperless.252 Judges will use telecommunications and
computers for full and inexpensive access from wherever they may be,
day or night, of the CJER's written, oral, and video resources, as well
248. Harry S. Martin III, From Ownership to Access: Standards of Quality for the Law
Library of Tomorrow, LAW LIBR. J., Winter 1990, at 129, 143-44.
249. See Douglas M. Costle & Carl A. Yirka, The Law Library of Congress as a Na-
tional Law Library, LAW LiaR. J., Spring 1991, at 219; Richard A. Danner, The Law Li-
brary of Congress and the Legal Profession, LAW LiBR. J., Spring 1991, at 211; M. Kathleen
Price, Building a National Law Library to Serve the World Legal Community, LAW LIaR.
J., Spring 1991, at 225.
250. See William 'Tining, Preparing Lawyers for the Twenty-First Century, 3 LEGAL
EDUC. Rnv. 1 (1992). But see Monroe Freedman, Law in the 21st Century, 60 FOrDHAM L.
REV. 503 (1991).
251. Among other innovations, closed-circuit interactive telecommunications will per-
mit rural judges to view programs they are now rarely able to attend, and the annual Judi-
cial College will be similarly accessible, as will more esoteric and cerebral programs,
including those on jurisprudence.
252. See Jim Meyer, The Paperless Chase, A.B.A. J., June 1993, at 94; Ronald Staudt,
Does Grandmother Come With It? Teaching and Practicing Law in the 21st Century (June
2, 1993) (white paper delivered at the National Institute on the Profession of Law in the
21st Century, Case Western Reserve University College of Law) (on file with author).
as case law, statutes, and legal treatises. 253 The CJER resources will
be kept current virtually daily.254 Moreover, with the advent of
mandatory judicial education, computers will facilitate reliable track-
ing of judges and their completion of required courses. 255
The CJER might consider undertaking preliminary communica-
tions with its counterpart organizations responsible for education and
training of the various professions that comprise the justice network.
Such communications may lead to new techniques to educate and in-
form other professionals and participants in the broader justice net-
work, including, among others, staffs of the offices of the Attorney
General, the State Public Defender, corrections agencies, the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles, the California Highway Patrol, probation de-
partments, county counsels, district attorneys, public defenders, and
local law enforcement agencies. Appellate courts, which are primarily
responsible for insuring the uniform explication of the law, may find
such an outreach effort to be helpful in promoting the uniform appli-
cation of law.
Should dialogue with other educational elements of the justice
network prove preliminarily successful, the CJER may find ways to
reach the appellate courts' audience directly with timely information
about the most current interpretations of the law. The CJER staff,
working in conjunction with these various educational devices and the
appellate courts, may identify important decisions, draft summaries of
those decisions in language appropriate for the audience, and elec-
tronically transmit those summaries state-wide. There is no reason,
for example, why law enforcement agencies around the state should
not be made immediately aware of new search and seizure decisions in
understandable language.2 56
253. See, e.g., William T. Braithwaite, How Is Technology Affecting the Practice and
Profession of Law?, 22 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 1113 (1991); Michael France, Multimedia
General Counsel Awaits a Revolution That Will Be Televised, S.F. DAILY J., July 15, 1993, at
1; George Nicholson, Judges, Technology and the Future, CT. REV., Spring 1990, at 5; Bob
Weibel, Information, Please, Books vs. CD vs. Online: Which Way Should You Go When
Your Fingers Do the Walking?, CAL. LAW., July 1993, at 39.
254. See Book Published Via Computer Will Never Reach Final Edition, INVESTOR'S
DAILY, Mar. 10, 1988, at 1.
255. Webster, Judicial Education Software Design Project Completed, CT. TECH. BULL.,
May-June 1993, at 6.
256. Making local police officers immediately aware of appellate decisions has other
important consequences. For example, police morale can be boosted by publicly communi-
cating appellate decisions that affirm the conduct of specific police officers. Likewise, po-
lice performance can be improved by quickly and specifically identifying those practices
that are disaffirmed by appellate courts.
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Any such outreach programs will also require new approaches
and new technologies. Expansion of the CJER's existing target audi-
ence to include other participants in the broader justice network will
entail an increase in the CJER's communication responsibilities.
Those responsibilities will not be overwhelming, however, because the
justice network will be entirely interconnected via a state-wide com-
puter network. With a communication network in place, reaching an
expanded audience will be as simple as communicating with the
CJER's existing audience.
G. Relationship to Law Schools
There was a time when law schools worked hand-in-hand with
both the bench and bar to improve the administration of justice. As
recently as 1940, Dean Roscoe Pound authored a book devoted en-
tirely to the structure of the court system. 7 But during the past thirty
years or so, an ever-widening gulf has opened between academia, on
the one hand, and the bench and bar, on the other hand. The gulf can
be seen most dramatically in the increasing irrelevance of legal schol-
arship to the practice of law.258 The gulf goes beyond that most visible
symptom to include law school curricula that increasingly emphasize
"law and [fill in the blank]" courses in which the "blank" is more im-
portant than the law.
The American Bar Association (ABA) has addressed law schools
in a recent report of the ABA's Section of Legal Education and Ad-
missions to the Bar.259 This report, known as the MacCrate Report,260
set forth a vision for increased cooperation between the bar and law
schools and suggested a renewed commitment by law schools to the
needs of the profession.
In 1984, at a program entitled "Legal Education and the Profes-
sion: Approaching the 21st Century," Judge J. Clifford Wallace of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made a similar call to academia:
Law schools have an important role to play in [the transformation
of law in the twenty-first century]. Law schools should provide re-
search to determine what structural and procedural changes should
be made throughout our system of justice. In looking to the law
257. RoscoE POUND, ORGANIZA71ON OF COURTS (1940).
258. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, One Judge's View of Academic Law Review Writing, 39 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 313 (1989); Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok-- Excesses in the Pursuit of
Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REv. 926 (1990).
259. See ABA SECION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATION CONTINUUM (1992).
260. Robert MacCrate was chair of the task force which produced the report.
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schools for research, we look to an historical strength of purpose,
albeit unfulfilled in some areas. There are examples of law school
faculty members who do provide us with research and insight into
the nature of the problems we face, often challenging our basic as-
sumptions about the limits of the current legal system in ways that
may help shape our future. Yet, too often the law schools' contribu-
tion is in other areas, sometimes exclusively so. I believe the law
schools contain an excess capacity for purposeful research and that
they should be called upon to use that capacity in conscious planning
for the future.261
This Article has called for further research to be conducted in a
number of areas. Needless to say, the Judiciary's limited financial re-
sources effectively preclude this much research from being conducted
by the Judiciary itself. The Judicial Council and law schools should
reach out to one another and identify talented faculty members and
students able to contribute to a better understanding of how the judi-
cial system may be refined and improved.
There is great promise for this cooperation, largely through the
work of the Commission on the Future of the Courts. With encour-
agement from the Chief Justice, law schools were of real interest to
the Commission. As a result, Boalt Hall, McGeorge School of Law,
Stanford Law School, and the University of Southern California,
among others, have contributed significantly to the Commission's
work.262 This hopeful beginning should be nurtured by the Council
and the state's law schools.
H. Relationship to Technology
The appellate system will not be immune to new technology. In-
deed, it is likely that the most far-reaching changes in handling ap-
peals will be brought by technology. The look and feel of an appeal
will be fundamentally different when an appellate judge and his or her
staff have immediate computer access to the entire record of proceed-
ings below (including the Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Tran-
script), counsels' appellate briefs directly linked to all authorities cited
and to all record cites,263 an all-inclusive "World Law Library," the
draft opinion, and comments from other judges on the panel. Refined
261. ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A DIA-
LOGUE ABOUT LEGAL EDUCATION As IT APPROACHES THE 21ST CENTURY 6 (J. Clark
Kelso ed. 1987) (quoting Judge Wallace) (emphasis added).
262. See 2020 Vision: A Plan for the Future of California Courts, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
1751 (1993).
263. It is possible that an appellate judge could simply highlight a case citation or rec-
ord citation, press a button, and have the record of that cited case immediately appear on
the screen.
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and wide-spread telepresence will also make it possible for appellate
justices to continue working regardless of location without meaningful
diminution of personal access to one another and staff or of
collegiality.
Technology comes with a price, of course, and carries its own pe-
culiar risks. Harry Martin of Harvard Law School warns us about
"the technocentered personality," who tries to match the performance
level of the machines with which she works, forgetting that the
machine is a machine, and she is human.26
Intelligently planned and carefully used, however, new technol-
ogy will facilitate working relationships between appellate justices and
their staffs, improve the efficiency with which the appellate system
does its job, and enhance the quality of its ultimate work product.
Properly conceived and applied, technology will be embraced by the
judiciary as a friendly and useful resource.
I. Relationship to the Media
Although many citizens end up in. court at one time or another
during their lives (either as a party or as a member of a jury), most
information about the courts reaches the public through instruments
of mass media. The public in California appears to hold a generally
low opinion of the courts, a majority of Californians (fifty-two per-
cent) indicating in a recent survey that they had an "only fair" or
"poor" opinion of the courts2 65 To the extent the public's opinion is
based on a thorough understanding of the court system, it becomes
incumbent upon the courts to reexamine the system. Yet the same
survey indicates that most citizens know very little about the court
system, with forty percent indicating they are "somewhat familiar"
with the courts and twenty-one percent indicating they are "not famil-
iar at all" with the courts. 266
The judiciary should reach out to the instruments of mass media,
helping reporters to understand better how the system works (and
sometimes does not work), giving the media more convenient and
greater access to the courts, and cooperating, when possible, with the
media as it attempts to inform the public about judicial business. Lo-
cal bench, bar, and media committees, which give the local media an
opportunity outside of the courthouse to become better acquainted
with the members of the bench and bar, is another avenue which
264. Martin, supra note 248, at 141.
265. Elizabeth Ellers, Survey the Future, 66 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 2183, 2189 (1993).
266. Id. at 2184-85.
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should be exploited. In general, giving the public greater access to
and information about the judiciary through the mass media is almost
certain to improve public understanding of and respect for the court
system.
Conclusion
The ultimate purpose of this Article is to conceive and portray a
preferred future for California's courts. California's appellate courts
should begin planning today by creating the framework for the future.
For centuries, appellate courts have promoted public trust in the
judicial system and in government by reviewing decisions from lower
courts or other governmental tribunals for legal or factual error. In
the course of reviewing those decisions, appellate courts have contrib-
uted to the development of a body of more or less predictable, uni-
form, and just laws. The three core goals-correcting errors
committed by other tribunals; enhancing predictability, uniformity,
and justice in the development of the law; and promoting public trust
in the judicial system-should remain the focus of the California ap-
pellate system.
Appellate judges are charged with the function of identifying
legal and factual errors committed by trial courts. Reversing decisions
based on prejudicial errors and affirming all other decisions (i.e., error
correction) protects litigants' rights to have disputes resolved in ac-
cordance with law. Explaining appellate decisions in publicly avail-
able written opinions would satisfy litigants' demands for
individualized justice and, by educating trial counsel and trial judges,
reduce the likelihood that similar errors will be repeated in the future
(i.e., error reduction).
Appellate courts should still pursue error correction and reduc-
tion primarily through review of individual cases. Error correction
necessarily involves individualized review. Error reduction, by con-
trast, may be accomplished in other ways. Appellate courts should
organize themselves more actively to reduce errors. For example, the
Judicial Council could include an Appellate and Trial Courts Coordi-
nating Council to recommend procedures, rules, and statutes to sim-
plify trial court functions and assist trial court judges in performing
those functions. The Judicial Council may include a State and Federal
Courts Habeas Corpus Council to identify repetitive constitutional er-
rors in criminal cases that lead to subsequent federal habeas chal-
lenges and recommend procedures, rules, and statutes to reduce such
errors. Both of these councils-and the Judicial Council as a whole-
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would utilize the scholarly and research resources of the Center for
Judicial Education and Research and the state's law schools.
Increased public availability of appellate opinions and the princi-
ple of stare decisis would foster development of a body of law to guide
the public, litigants, lawyers, and the courts in resolving future dis-
putes. Law that is clear in formulation and predictable in application
facilitates conformation of conduct to the law, and would thereby re-
duce the number of disputes which need to be litigated. When dis-
putes arise, lawyers would be able to render advice regarding likely
resolution with more certainty. Finally, trial courts would be less
likely to err because the law would be clear and predictable.
Appellate courts could maximize clarity and predictability in the
law consistent with the demands of justice by promoting public har-
mony and trust in government. Particularly, appellate courts should
seek to establish clear rules of law in preference to general standards
or guidelines for consideration by a trier of fact. General guidelines,
while arguably serving the needs of justice, create unnecessary bat-
tlegrounds for litigants.
Appellate courts should no longer be physically and information-
ally remote from the public, litigants, lawyer, or trial courts. Appel-
late courts, with the help of educational institutions (including the
Center for Judicial Education and Research), should utilize mul-
timedia programs to explain the goals, rules, and procedures of the
appellate system and to disseminate summaries of important appellate
decisions. The programs should be accessed easily on computer or
video terminals throughout the entire justice network, at trial court
facilities, law enforcement agencies, jails and prisons, educational in-
stitutions, public libraries, public and private law firm libraries, the
media, and through dial-in services.
Appellate courts must utilize a wide range of information and
communication technologies. Most components of state government
would be essentially paperless. Information should be stored elec-
tronically, and paper copies of that information would be used only
when paper provides a clearly superior medium. All state agencies,
including the appellate courts and the Center for Judicial Education
and Research, should agree upon a standard electronic data structure
to make it possible for information to be shared electronically be-
tween agencies.
Appellate courts and trial courts would be paperless as well. All
filings would be in an approved electronic medium (any paper, includ-
ing those in pro se cases, would be immediately scanned by trial court
staff into that electronic medium). All filings would also automati-
cally be included in the clerk's transcript, electronically accessible as a
public document. Court reporters could prepare and compile an accu-
rate reporter's transcript in real-time by using computer-assisted tran-
scription technology. The reporter's transcript would also be
electronically accessible as a public document.
The clerk's transcript and reporter's transcript of a perfected ap-
peal would be immediately available to the appellate court for review
and processing. All motions and briefs on appeal would be submitted
in an approved electronic medium or scanned by appellate court staff
into electronic medium. Absent court order, the entire record on ap-
peal and all appellate motions and briefs would be accessible as public
documents with direct access from telephones or interactive television
to other public court information as well, such as the scheduling of
arguments, hearings, or trials.
An electronic law library network would link together all law li-
braries in the state and the country and be freely available by telecom-
munication to all litigants, counsel, and the appellate courts through
terminals located in trial court and appellate court facilities, law en-
forcement agencies, jails and prisons, educational institutions, public
libraries, public and private law firm libraries, and through dial-in
services. The public should have direct access through telephone and
interactive television to law library resources. The Judicial Council
would include a Law Library Coordinating Council to define and fos-
ter application of policies related to, and the development of, the law
library network.
Without meaningful diminution of personal access to one another
and staff or to collegiality, telepresence and telecommuting would
permit appellate justices to perform their work anywhere and at any
time. Simply by dialing into the Appellate Court Network, justices
would have instant access to all publicly available materials such as
published cases, statutes, and treatises, along with the record and all
filings and motions in every case. The court's private materials like
internal memoranda from clerks, electronic mail from judicial col-
leagues, staff, and draft opinions would also be immediately
accessible.
Most appellate arguments would be conducted by telepresence
using High Definition Television video-conferencing capabilities to
save time and money for both the courts and counsel. All supreme
court arguments and selected court of appeal arguments would be
broadcast live through the cable system directly to the media and the
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public. This easy access to appellate processes should facilitate public
understanding and trust in the judicial system.
While the use of new technologies would enable appellate courts
to keep pace with increasing caseloads, those technologies will not in-
terfere with the judiciary's fundamental character as an institution
that relies upon human judgment in applying law to resolve individual
disputes.
Finally, although the judiciary would remain the indispensable
core of the state's broader justice network, the purpose of which is to
preserve public trust, promote civil liberties, and foster domestic or-
der, the judicial branch-and the appellate courts in particular-
would continue to require but a comparatively small portion of the
state's overall budget. The number of appellate judges should not sig-
nificantly increase, but staff support should more than double, with
each intermediate appellate justice assigned five law clerks, and each
supreme court justice even more.
Appendix
Preferred Vision for the Future of the Appellate Courts
Appellate Courts Committee Commission on the Future of the
Courts
July 20, 1993
1. Although the appellate system operates in the context of a changed
society and environment, it continues to serve the same fundamen-
tal governmental functions it has served for centuries.
2. The core goals of the appellate system continue to be:
(a) to correct and reduce the number of errors committed by other
tribunals;
(b) to enhance predictability, uniformity and justice in the devel-
opment of the law; and
(c) to promote public trust in the judicial system.
3. Appellate courts continue to correct erroneous trial court decisions
by reviewing the record on appeal for legal and factual errors. Ap-
pellate courts reduce the number of trial court errors and improve
the quality of justice by expanding the channels of communication
with trial courts, other branches, agencies and levels of govern-
ment, federal courts, the bar, and law schools.
4. Appellate courts continue to guide the development of the law to
maximize clarity and predictability in its formulation and applica-
tion. Thus, citizens are better able to conform their behavior to the
law and to anticipate legal consequences, with the result fewer dis-
putes need to be litigated at the trial court level, and fewer litigated
disputes lead to appeal. The quality of justice at the trial court
level, which includes a rich mix of alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms, satisfies most litigants their claims are fairly and fully
heard, and, most importantly, correctly and clearly decided.
5. Multimedia programs are transmitted from appellate courts to
computer terminals or video kiosks located in trial court facilities,
law enforcement agencies, jails and prisons, educational institu-
tions, and public and private libraries to inform users (trial court
staffs, public and private lawyers, litigants, and the public) about
the law, including appellate rules and procedures. These programs
improve submissions to the appellate courts by increasing users'
understanding of the appellate process. Such understanding pro-
motes better, more timely submissions and enhances greater public
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trust that appellate justice is being rendered in compliance with the
law, fairly and justly to all.
6. The appellate courts are paperless, thereby reducing the time and
costs associated with processing appeal. Appellate justices and
their staffs, lawyers, litigants, and the public have easier access to
briefs, records, files, law libraries, court schedules, and legal opin-
ions. Without meaningful diminution of personal access to one an-
other and staff or to collegiality, telepresence and telecommuting
permit appellate justices to work anywhere and at any time. Many
appellate arguments are conducted by telepresence using video-
conferencing capabilities. Trust in the judicial system is promoted
by making available to the media and the public live broadcasts of
all supreme court oral arguments and selected court of appeal oral
arguments.
7. In cooperation with other agencies, appellate courts have agreed to
uniform standards for electronic data structures, permitting infor-
mation to be transmitted electronically throughout the justice
network.
8. An electronic law library network links together all law libraries in
the state and the country. The network is accessible to each appel-
late and trial court, lawyers, litigants, and the public. The public
has direct access to law library resources through telephone and
interactive television. The Judicial Council includes a Law Library
Coordinating Council to define and facilitate application of policies
related to, and the development of, the law library network.
9. Recognition of the indispensable core role the judiciary plays in
preserving public trust, civil liberties, and order, and appreciation
of the fragility of the judiciary in light of the comparatively small
portion of the state budget accorded to appellate courts, has cre-
ated better, more effective budgeting for the appellate courts by
the Legislature. The number of appellate judges has not signifi-
cantly increased, but staff support has more than doubled, with
each intermediate appellate justice being assigned five law clerks,
and each supreme court justice even more. The judiciary's budget
includes only those items that properly reflect judicial functions.
The Legislature does not consider costs associated with providing
indigent counsel as part of the judiciary's budget. The judiciary's
budget includes probation services, which are overseen by the Ad-
ministrative Office of Courts since those services are under the di-
rect control and supervision of, and indispensable to, the judiciary.
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